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Letter from the Editors
The Gettysburg Historical Journal embodies the History
Department's dedication to diverse learning and excellence in
academics. Each year, the Journal publishes the top student work
in a range of topics across the spectrum of academic disciplines
with different methodological approaches to the study of history.
In the words of Marc Bloch, author of The Historian's Craft,
"history is neither watchmaking nor cabinet construction. It is an
endeavor toward better understanding." In the spirit of this maxim,
our authors strive to elucidate the many facets of human societies
and cultures. Whether these young scholars' research is focused on
politics, religion, economics, environmental history, or women,
gender, and sexuality studies, and the editorial staff is consistently
proud of the diverse subject matter we select for publication.
With the assistance of the Cupola, Gettysburg College's
online research repository, and the distinguished college faculty,
our authors' work has received both serious scholarly attention and
national accolades. Past authors have also gone on to publish
follow-up work in refereed journals, and to present their work at
undergraduate and professional conferences. The Historical
Journal is primarily a student-run organization, and as such, it
provides undergraduate students with a unique opportunity to gain
valuable experience reviewing, editing, and organizing academic
articles for publication. In all cases, authors and editors have also
5

had the opportunity to apply these skills to their future careers, or
to

their

work

as

graduate

students.

This fifteenth edition of the Historical Journal continues
the tradition of scholarly rigor of past volumes, while broadening
both the diversity of historical perspectives and the methodologies
employed by each author. Each of the following works selected for
this edition exemplifies the varied interests of the History students
at Gettysburg College. In her article, ""Where We May Oftener
Converse

Together":

Translation

of

Written

and

Spoken

Communication in Colonial Pennsylvania," Jenna Fleming
examines the impact of language barriers and translation
difficulties on the relationships between Native Americans and
European colonists on the Pennsylvania frontier.
Ryan M. Nadeau's article "Creating a Statesman: The Early
Life of Prince Clemens von Metternich and its Effect on his
Political Philosophy" sheds light on Prince Clemens von
Metternich's formative years and how his early life shaped his
Metternichian principles.
In "Virtus in the Roman World: Generality, Specificity, and
Fluidity," Kyle Schrader explores the evolving definition of the
Roman concept of virtus through the Roman Republic. He argues
that, over time, the definition of virtus shifted from a concept with
many loose definitions of morality and character to one that was
exclusively used to define those who were successful.
In his article, "The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara: The
6

Economic and Political Persecutions and the Tradition of Peasant
Revolt," Jake Farias examines the Shimabara Rebellion in
Tokugawa Japan, building a narrative connection between
Christian resistance to the Tokugawa government and the strife of
Japan's impoverish peasants. Through his examination, he explores
the causes of the rebellion and seeks to contextualize it among
other rebellions of the era.
In ""Under the auspices of peace": The Northwest Indian
War and its Impact on the Early American Republic," Melanie L.
Fernandes analyzes the influence of the Northwest Indian War on
early American policy, arguing that the conflict led to reforms
which, ultimately, strengthened the federal government's power.
Collectively, these articles not only show the hard work and
careful research of our student authors, but they also exemplify the
diverse interests of our students and the many research
opportunities available to them at Gettysburg College.

The General Editors,

Melanie L. Fernandes
Ryan M. Nadeau
Sophia D. Vayansky
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"Where We May Oftener Converse Together":
Translation of Written and Spoken
Communication in Colonial Pennsylvania
By
Jenna Fleming
~

~

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
systems of communication between Europeans and Indians in
North American remained in their formative stages. As members
of both groups attempted to gauge each other’s motives, learn
about cultural practices, and establish mutually beneficial
relationships, they faced many obstacles to understanding. The
most evident of these were differences in language, as the vastly
inconsistent backgrounds and structures of European and Indian
languages made basic communication difficult for the earliest
interpreters. In addition to problems of language learning,
translation, and contextual usage that accompanied spoken
conversation, written forms of dialogue presented other equally
formidable challenges to the peoples of early colonial America.
The unique environment of Pennsylvania, established under and
governed by Quaker religious ideals, presented a setting in which
interactions between Indians and Europeans evolved differently
than in other colonies. From William Penn’s founding of the
11

colony and first contact with the area’s Indians in 1682,
negotiation rather than dominance was instituted as precedent in
native relations. 1 While both sides consistently touted aims of
peaceful coexistence and enthusiastic cooperation, attainment of
these goals was often incomplete at best.
From

its

seat

at

Philadelphia,

the

Pennsylvanian

government continually attempted to extend its influence and
territorial claims outward. Contact, conflict, and the need for
cooperation with different Indian groups posed major challenges in
communication, too great for the legislature to handle. Likewise,
Indian peoples faced similar difficulties in regard to tribal
affiliation, land ownership, and the development of trade with
colonial societies. In these situations, specialized representatives
acted as messengers, translators, interpreters, negotiators, or in any
combination of these roles. 2 Individuals had an important position
within the greater narrative of relations between colonists and
Indians, whether they were professionals sponsored by officials or
happened upon their duties by chance. English or native, each
possessed a singular experience, skill set, and personal views and
helped to simultaneously complicate and ease the delicate process
of communication between and within their societies.
On every level, perceptions of language played a major part

1

James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania
Frontier (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), 61.
2
Ibid., 56.
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in creating the general structure and course of negotiations in
colonial

Pennsylvania.

Personal

prejudices,

conversational

misunderstandings, deft omissions, honest mistakes, and willful
mistranslations all functioned as manipulations of language, which
intentional or not, had an impact on the people who experienced
them. The importance of language is evidenced in a multitude of
instances. In 1750, Conrad Weiser’s companion Christian Daniel
Claus, unable to understand an Indian religious ritual and trusting
his own assumptions, made an inaccurate record of the ceremony
in his travel journal. 3 Though this failure in communication could
have proved harmful only to Claus within the context of his
education about Indian negotiations, if passed on to others the
misunderstanding could have had more widespread negative
effects.
The study of communication in colonial Pennsylvania is
complicated by two factors: translation and availability of primary
sources. Residents of the colony came from a wide variety of
backgrounds and spoke many different languages of European and
North American origin. Though many prominent negotiators and
even some regular citizens had experience in two or more
languages, levels of proficiency varied and the lack of standardized
forms complicated the situation. While different Indian groups

3

Christian Daniel Claus, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad
Weiser: A Journey to Onondaga, 1750, trans. and ed. Helga Doblin and William
A. Starna (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1994), 47.
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were connected by language stocks, many dialects existed, each
with their own particularities. The transfer of Indian languages,
which did not have a written form prior to European contact, from
spoken word to paper, served as another form of translation.
Though it presented a significant contemporary challenge,
translation is still an issue for historians of the era, as they attempt
to work with sources written in languages they may not be familiar
with or in a mixture of dialects. In any context, a translated piece is
a step away from the original, and in an historical sense the
relationship between the two can be even more intricate. The
translations recorded for present-day use were made at different
times – some by primary recorders and others years later – and in
different circumstances, some rushed and haphazard, others
methodical and purposeful. The historian’s task is to recognize and
consider these factors while evaluating a source for its content.
The general lack of primary written sources left by Indians
creates a problem for almost any study of Native American history.
The most complete records of Indian communications come from
the colonial perspective, through official accounts of treaty
negotiations and government councils or personal diaries. Any
report of Indian words, documented by white colonists, includes
supplementary descriptions and judgments of Indian behavior and
conduct. Though these sources can be helpful in providing more
information about colonial perceptions and relations between the
two groups, it can also be challenging to proceed given the lack of
14

evidence from the Indian voice.
In spite of these challenges, there is a strong foundation of
scholarship on the subject. Some authors have focused on the
process of negotiation itself and the people who took part in it,
considering their identities and functions within the structure of
colonial government. 4 Others study the importance of oratory and
the ways in which it was regarded and utilized by both colonists
and Indians. 5 Studies of specific instances of communication, such
as land purchases and trade agreements, also contribute to
scholarship on the use of language in colonial America. 6 As it was
a widely influential and pervasive issue, information on
communication can be found in many secondary sources on the
early history of Pennsylvania.
The fragility and flexibility of language, revealed in a long
and complex series of interactions, influenced the course of
exchange in early Pennsylvania. Inhabitants of the colony during
4

Merrell, Into the American Woods; Margaret Connell Szasz, ed., Between
Indian and White Worlds: The Cultural Broker (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1994).
5
Sandra M. Gustafson, Eloquence is Power: Oratory and Performance in Early
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nancy L.
Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them’: The Interpreter as Cultural Broker
during Anglo-Iroquois Councils, 1740-70,” Ethnohistory 35, no. 1 (Winter
1988), JSTOR.
6
Colin G. Calloway, Pen & Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in
American Indian History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); James H.
Merrrell, “‘I Desire All That I Have Said . . . May Be Taken down Aright’:
Revisiting Teedyuscung's 1756 Treaty Council Speeches,” The William and
Mary Quarterly 63, no. 4 (Oct., 2006), JSTOR.
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the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries had a wide
variety of perspectives on language, its abilities, and its proper
uses. A significant cultural gulf separated Indians and colonists,
yet they remained connected through the vast number of
opportunities for communication available to them. At their most
fundamental level, these methods of interaction can be divided into
two categories: nonverbal and verbal. The first encompasses such
diverse themes as behavioral cues, vocal intonation, performance
practices, and the creation, distribution, and interpretation of
wampum — an especially prominent characteristic of contact
between Indians and colonists, and one that functioned as both an
asset and a challenge to those involved. 7 These nonverbal forms of
communication, while significant, represent a largely separate,
distinct topic with its own background of research, scholarship,
and implications. The second, verbal category of communication
involves the use of the spoken and written word, allowing for a
more concrete examination of the disparities and parallels between
native and English cultures, languages, and constructions. Issues of
translation, speech, and text revealed and in some cases caused
points of contention between the two peoples of early
Pennsylvania. Though colonists and Indians attempted to find
common methods of communication, with varying degrees of
success, differences added up, contributing to the difficulty of

7

Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them,’” 66.
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maintaining positive relations between the two groups.

Colonial Pennsylvania was a region of mixed populations
and identities: cultural, social, national, religious, and linguistic.
Residents came from a variety of backgrounds and were divided
along lines much more intricate than those which simply separated
Indian and European peoples. Colonists came primarily from
England, in a reflection of the colony’s founding heritage, but
significant German and Scots-Irish populations were also present.
The historical establishments of New Netherland and New Sweden
accounted for a small but enduring populace of Northern European
origins.

8

Each of these groups naturally possessed its own

linguistic tradition, distinguished from European forms of language
and influenced by North American interactions. Indian residents of
the area experienced a similar diversity of languages. While most
native Pennsylvanian languages were derived from one of two
major language stocks, the Algonquian or Iroquois, the many
differences between individual dialects meant that languages of the
same stock could still be mutually incomprehensible. Even when
conversing among themselves, Shawnees, Delawares, Piscataways,
Nanticokes, and members of the Iroquois Confederacy would
likely need translators. 9 Language was, therefore, a concern that
8

Joseph E. Illick, Colonial Pennsylvania: A History (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 28.
9
Merrell, Into the American Woods, 57.
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residents of the region that became Pennsylvania had coped with
long before the arrival of William Penn, or indeed any European
colonist. By the time of England’s conquest of New Netherland in
1664, the Dutch colonists and Delaware Indians in the area had
already created the “Delaware Jargon,” a pidgin dialect of their
respective languages used to further trade and diplomatic relations
between officials of the two groups. 10 From his arrival in North
America in 1682 onwards, the colonial proprietor William Penn
made an effort to establish clear and candid systems of
communication with native residents. 11 For those who did not
share in Penn’s benign goals or have access to his resources,
translation proved an even greater challenge, placing a significant
early demand on those who were proficient in languages.
The role and identity of the translator was a multifaceted
and delicate concept, singular to each individual who took on the
significant responsibility of mediating between cultures. This
position, which James H. Merrell comprehensively examined in
Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania
Frontier, demanded a high level of linguistic and social skill, a
great deal of commitment, and exceedingly good judgment,
10

William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter, eds., Friends and Enemies in
Penn’s Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 19.
11
Articles of Agreement with the Susquehanna Indians (1701), in The Papers of
William Penn, vol. 4., 1685-1700, ed. Marianne S. Wokeck et al. (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), EBSCOhost eBook Collection, 51.
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especially under pressure. Rarely could a person serve in the
capacity of a translator alone; inherent differences between
European and Indian languages meant that basic, literal translation
between the two often produced an unsatisfactory result.
Therefore, when moving between languages, translators were
required to interpret messages, even on a rudimentary level. 12
Interpretation was a more involved practice than translation,
requiring an understanding not only of words’ definitions, but also
their meanings, connotations, and implications.
The individuals responsible for interpretation consequently
required a greater familiarity with their contemporary political and
social environment than was possessed by the average citizen.
Translators, whether of Indian or colonial origin, were frequently
in close contact with their community leaders and kept wellinformed of relevant economic changes and military operations. 13
For most, travel was an innate part of their occupation, as they
journeyed within and beyond the colony’s established borders to
gather information, deliver messages, attend councils, and in some
cases prevent misunderstandings that could lead to potential
diplomatic disasters. Records of these journeys, such as Christian
Frederick Post’s account of his 1758 trip from Philadelphia to the
12

Hagedorn, “‘A Friend to go between Them,’” 64.
Nancy L. Hagedorn, “Faithful, Knowing, and Prudent’: Andrew Montour as
Interpreter and Cultural Broker, 1740-1722,” in Between Indian and White
Worlds: The Cultural Broker, ed. Margaret Connell Szasz (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press), 1994, 49.
13
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Ohio River and Conrad Weiser’s report of his 1750 expedition to
Onondaga, emphasize how often the translator or interpreter was
called upon to act as a negotiator, whether or not that title had been
part of his original job description. Often functioning as the sole
speaker or the head of a small party representing his own
government and society, the translator faced the difficult
responsibility of creating a balance in communicating messages.
While accuracy and truthfulness were crucial, professional
messengers often took or were given license to edit, alter, and
generally improvise in delivery, even and especially in cases of
“delicate and inflammatory topics.” 14 When dealing with replies
from the opposite side and formulating their own responses,
mediators were forced to make compromises and concessions,
increasing their personal participation in the process and
attempting to build their reputations as honest and dependable
envoys. Those who worked directly with language translation
found their roles and duties expanded as they were eventually
identified, subliminally or explicitly, not only as translators but
also as interpreters, messengers, negotiators, representatives, and
diplomats.
In consideration of language and translation on the
Pennsylvanian frontier, one must ask upon what occasions and in
what areas specific languages were utilized for cross-cultural

14

James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods, 200.
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communication. Government business, land and trade negotiations,
military encounters, and more casual contact between civilians all
represented very different situations in which a European
language, an Indian language, some conglomeration of the two, or
an entirely separate method might be chosen as the medium of
interaction between two or more individuals. Geography might
likewise have a part in determining linguistic habits, with native
languages dominating in Indian-controlled or more rural areas and
European languages taking precedence in more heavily-settled
areas under colonial governance. 15 However, each interaction
between Indians and colonists possessed its own unique character
and qualities, making generalizations about language usage
difficult to determine. The primary governing factor in exchange
was the language abilities of those participating in a given
conversation; this detail was clearly variable, making the
particulars of any interaction dependent upon not only its social or
geographical circumstances but also the individuals involved.
Record-keeping, or lack thereof, presents a similar
challenge to an analysis of language use. Instances of unofficial or
non-governmental relations between natives and colonists would
frequently have gone unrecorded, if only due to the prevalence of
low literacy rates.

16

Even in cases of military or economic

negotiations, cross-cultural conversations and especially the details
15
16

Pencak and Richter, eds., Friends and Enemies, 108.
Merrell, Into the American Woods, 194.
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of such were largely seen as so mundane as not to merit
documentation. Except in influential, extraordinary, or somehow
otherwise important cases, exchanges between Indians and
colonists were not remarked upon. This absence of documentation
nevertheless provides some information regarding the popular
attitude towards issues of language in colonial Pennsylvania.
Difficulties in communication, attempts to find common
languages, and employment of translators were so common as not
to typically draw comment. These challenges, then, can be
understood as facts of life for those living on both sides of the
Pennsylvania frontier.
Even when documented, references to language are not
always easily understood. In his 1758 diary recounting his
diplomatic mission to the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo Indians
at the Ohio River, Christian Frederick Post described interactions
with individuals of many different cultural backgrounds, who
presumably spoke a variety of languages. Post himself was fluent
in or at least comfortable with several languages of European and
Indian origin. However, he only occasionally made note of the
languages he utilized to communicate with his friends, enemies,
and counterparts. On August 10, about one month after his party
set out from Bethlehem, Post recorded that “we met three
Frenchmen, who appeared very shy of us, but said nothing more
than to enquire, whether we knew of any English coming against
22

Venango.” 17 Just two days later, on August 12, he wrote of a
conference

with

Tamaqua,

the

brother

of

his

associate

Pisquetomen and another Shawnee ally: “In the evening king
Beaver came again, and told me, they had held a council, and sent
out to all their towns, but it would take five days before they could
all come together. I thanked him for his care.” 18 It is probable Post
would have needed to deviate from his typical English to
communicate with the French or Shawnee, and it is even possible
that another translator could have aided in these interactions.
However, the author did not find a description of the linguistic path
the conversations took relevant to his account of their occurrence,
a demonstration of how the content of messages was often
prioritized

over

methods

of

communication

in

colonial

Pennsylvania. Conrad Weiser, a contemporary of Post who served
in a similar capacity, generally provided even fewer details about
language when documenting his work. In reference to negotiations
with the Iroquois in September 1750, Weiser recorded only that “I
Informed them of my Business . . . I told them of the letter I had
from the Governor of Carolina about the Catabaws. He [the Oneida
17

Christian Frederick Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, from
Philadelphia to the Ohio, on a Message from the Government of Pensylvanio to
the Delaware, Shawnese, and Mingo Indians, Settles There, in Early Western
Travels, vol. 1, Journals of Conrad Weiser, 1748; George Croghan, 1750-1765;
Christian Frederick Post, 1758; Thomas Morris, 1764, ed. Reuben Gold
Thwaites (Cleveland, OH: A.H. Clark Co., 1904), Early Encounters in North
America, Alexander Street Press, 2015 (accessed October 14, 2015), 192.
18
Ibid., 193.
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representative] told me that the Cat. would never sue for a
peace.” 19
It was not only professional negotiators who did not feel
the need to explain details of conversations on Pennsylvania’s
frontier. Christian Daniel Claus, a young German immigrant who
accompanied Weiser in 1750, offered an interesting perspective in
his account of the trip. Claus, who was as unfamiliar with his
surroundings as he was with Indian customs, functioned more as
an objective outsider than an involved participant like Weiser. At
the beginning of his journal, he noted his hopes to “to pay good
attention — as it recently became evident — to the name of the
kingdom or empire wherever he happens to be . . . its regents,
statutes, laws, liberties, prerogatives, pretensions, code of arms,
ethics, mores, habits, language, commerce and income.” 20 His
lofty intentions notwithstanding, Claus neglected to record the
language of conversation when meeting with representatives of the
Mohawks, Oneidas, and other nations. Like the more experienced
messengers, he focused on the substance and subject of a
communication rather than the features of its delivery. Even, or
perhaps especially, in a sensitive and potentially serious situation,
when learning of the death of an important ally, Claus said little
about the actual communication of the information, writing only
“we met an Indian hunter with the message that Canasatego, the
19
20

Weiser, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 11.
Claus, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 6.
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chief of the 6 Nations, had grown pale in death a few days ago. Mr.
W. was alarmed and considered our long journey in vain because
in such a case no council would be assembled.” 21 Once again, the
absence of the details illustrated the lack of importance they held
for Weiser and Claus; their main concern was obtaining the facts,
regardless of how they might be conveyed, and formulating a
response that was both respectful and pragmatic.
For

men

like

Post

and

Weiser,

accustomed

to

communicating in different languages and writing primarily to
keep track of their diplomatic successes and failures, actual
methods of conversing were secondary in importance to the
messages being passed back and forth. They were both in the
employment of the provincial council of Pennsylvania and kept
mainly English records, though Weiser was the more apt to stray
from this convention, occasionally writing about personal matters
in his native German. 22 When English was clearly not the original
language of a speech, both men typically provided a silent
translation or interpretation, always keeping in mind the ultimate
purpose of their records as reportable to the colonial government.
During the latter half of 1758, Post and his Indian associate
Pisquetomen were once again called upon to deliver a message to
several groups of Ohio Indians. While conferring with the
Shawnee and members of the Five Nations, they encountered
21
22

Ibid., 42.
Weiser, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 4.
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several western Cherokee Indians, whom they likewise informed
of the Pennsylvanian governor’s offer of peace between the
nations. Post later wrote in his journal that “the Cherokees
answered and said; ‘they should be glad to know how far the
friendship was to reach; they, for themselves, wished it might
reach from the sun-rise to the sun-set.” 23 Though it is doubtful that
Post delivered the message in its original English or received the
reply in the same, he felt no need to make note of the perhaps
multiple translations that were necessary before the parties
achieved a mutual understanding.

Only in exceptional cases did

casual observers or experienced mediators explicitly mention
linguistic issues or identify situations in which translation
occurred. One example is found in the Observations of John
Bartram, a naturalist who joined Weiser and his Oneida partner,
Shickellamy, on a trip to Onondaga in the summer of 1743.
Awakened in the middle of their first night at the Indian settlement
by a disturbance outside the home in which they were staying,
Bartram, essentially a tourist accompanying the diplomatic
mission, was curious as to its cause. He recalled:
I ask’d Conrad Weiser, who as well
as myself lay next the alley, what
noise that was? Shickalamy the
Indian chief, our companion, who I
supposed, thought me somewhat
scared, called out, lye still John, I
23

Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, 239.

26

never heard him speak so much plain
English before. 24
The mysterious noise turned out to be nothing more than a
customary Oneida ritual, but Shickellamy’s response is notable for
its brevity, as it was evidently the longest English speech Bartram
had ever heard the Oneida leader make. Whether Bartram was in
truth “somewhat scared,” or not, the situation was sufficiently
fraught to cause Shickellamy to break his own linguistic habits,
drawing from Bartram a rare comment on speech.
Post had a comparable experience early on in his first
diplomatic trip of 1758. Finding themselves lost, the party
fortunately “met with an Indian, and one that I took to be a
runagade English Indian trader; he spoke good English, was very
curious in examining every thing.” 25 Post’s considerable surprise
at encountering an English-speaking Indian in the mountains
twenty miles from Fort Duquesne merited his making a record of
the incident. He must have regarded this individual as potentially
important, perhaps thinking that he could be an asset to Post’s own
mission or to Pennsylvanian diplomacy in general. Conversely, the
English-speaking Indian and others like him could pose a threat to
the colony’s interests, should they choose to ally instead with
foreign forces.
24

John Bartram, Observations on a Visit to Onondaga, July – August 1743, in
The Lancaster Treaty of 1744 with Related Documents, ed. James H. Merrell
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2008), 93.
25
Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, 192.
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Weiser typically remarked upon the translation process
when he felt that it could be especially relevant to the results of a
discussion. Speaking on behalf of the Pennsylvania government at
the 1750 council at Onondaga, he was forced to rely upon a Six
Nations interpreter. Eager to clarify the particulars of the situation
as a way to explain any possible errors, irregularities, or
miscommunications, Weiser introduced his customary account of
his speech by noting, “the speaker at my request and by my
direction spoke again to the following purport and in my behalf.” 26
He repeated the qualifying statement several times in his
description, later writing that he “gave a Belt of Wampum and
desired the speaker to speak as follows.” 27 His choice of the word
“desired” in this passage is significant, as it indicates the
uneasiness and uncertainty he felt, as well as makes an attempt to
excuse him from responsibility for a potentially faulty translation.
Surely Weiser, who was a prolific and successful interpreter,
appreciated the difficulties and complexities of the job his Indian
counterpart took on. At the same time, he expressed reservations
about allowing someone other than himself to translate his
message.

In context, Weiser’s hesitance is understandable; the basic
differences between Indian and English modes of speech made
26
27

Weiser, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 18.
Ibid., 18.

28

interpretation a difficult task even under the best of circumstances.
A major, fundamental disparity between languages of European
and North American origin is their utilization and subsequent
connotations of figures of speech. For the majority of Englishspeaking

colonists,

metaphors

functioned

as

linguistic

embellishment and were mostly used in literary settings rather than
ordinary, day-to-day conversation.

28

They might also carry

spiritual overtones, as the strongly Protestant population of
Pennsylvania would have been familiar with Biblical proverbs
through religious education and church attendance. Conversely for
Indians, figures of speech operated as a standard of language, used
in a variety of situations including discussion of mundane
matters. 29 Indians’ tendency towards metaphor drew comment and
response from colonists on several occasions and ultimately
influenced the language of diplomacy between the two.
This feature of Indian speech was documented from the
earliest instances of English contact. In 1682 at a treaty signing
with William Penn near Philadelphia, the Delaware chief
Tammany expressed his hopes that the two nations would “live as
brothers as long as the sun and moon shine in the sky.” 30
Significantly, the records of this meeting indicate Tammany’s use
of English when speaking with Penn – a notable occurrence,
28
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especially so early on in the colony’s existence. The chief’s
willingness and ability to translate his words himself, rather than
employing a third party as became customary into the eighteenth
century, demonstrated his desire to communicate openly with
Penn. However, his words also provide information regarding
methods of translation. Rather than attempt to convert Indian
metaphors into conventional English phrases, Tammany and other
interpreters favored a literal method of translation. The result was a
message that came closer to the original Delaware words than a
broader translation might have done, but one that required a greater
deal of analysis on the colonial side.
References to Indian usage of figures of speech are found
in a variety of colonial records. In observing a discussion between
the Shawnee and Six Nations factions at Fort Duquesne in
November of 1758, Christian Frederick Post noted representatives’
mutual, respectful acknowledgment of gifts and appropriate
ceremonies: “King Beaver [Tamaqua] addressed himself to the
Cayuga chief, and said. . . . you have wiped the tears from our
eyes, and cleaned our bodies from the blood; when you spoke to
me I saw myself all over bloody; and since you cleaned me I feel
myself quite pleasant through my whole body.” 31 This statement
was a reference to the At the Woods’ Edge ceremony, performed
to ready travelers for diplomatic talks, but it also recognized the
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relationship between the two Indian groups. 32 In his reply to the
Shawnee, the Cayuga speaker made similar use of metaphor in
describing the establishment of peace between his people and the
colonial government of Pennsylvania. He urged his “cousins” to
follow the Six Nations’ example, proclaiming, “We likewise take
the tomahawk out of your hands, that you received from the white
people; use it no longer. . . . when I came I found you in a moving
posture, ready to jump towards the sunset, so we will set you at
ease, and quietly down.” 33 The records of these conversations are
incomplete and imperfect, a translated version only representative
of what Post was allowed to witness and what he chose to
document for personal purposes. Nevertheless, they provide
evidence of communication between different native groups and
the language they used, confirming that by the mid-eighteenth
century, inter-Indian relations operated in similar ways as colonial
diplomacy did.
Though Indians and colonists were accustomed to differing
characteristics of communication, they developed a common
method for conducting official business. The text of the Lancaster
Treaty of 1744 exemplifies the ways in which Pennsylvanian and
native officials came to a linguistic compromise, each adopting
elements of the other’s speech to create a discourse somewhere
between the literal and metaphorical. At the opening of the treaty
32
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conference on June 25, Governor George Thomas addressed
representatives from Virginia, Maryland, and the Six Nations,
announcing to the Indians that the three united colonial
governments were “come to enlarge the Fire, which was almost
gone out, and to make it burn clearer; to brighten the Chain which
had contracted some Rust, and to renew their Friendship with
you.” 34 In this part of his speech, Thomas made reference to a
council fire, an important feature of negotiations for Indians and
one to which the Six Nations attendees would have been
accustomed. Despite the absence of an actual fire at the Lancaster
courthouse, the governor recognized the suggestion of one as a
polite gesture towards his audience. After setting the tone for
discussion, Thomas went on to describe in more concrete terms
Pennsylvania’s wishes for peace between the Indians and English
colonies. 35
The Six Nations delegation, aware of the differences
between conversing with a seasoned interpreter like Weiser or Post
and the colonial commissioners, made similar alterations in their
methods of address. Tachanoontia, the Indian speaker, made
repeated allusions to geography during his response to the Virginia
coalition on June 27. He spoke of hills, mountains, and roads in a
tangible sense, mixing the literal with the metaphorical tradition of
34
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the Iroquois language. Describing the broken terms of an earlier
treaty, Tachanoontia lamented that “We had not been long in the
Use of this new Road before your People came, like Flocks of
Birds and sat down on both Sides of it . . . we are now opening our
Hearts to you, we cannot avoid complaining, and desire all these
Affairs may be settled.” 36 At Lancaster in 1744, as at other
councils that followed, colonists and Indians operated within an
increasingly integrated system of interactions, blending elements
from their own cultures to create a new type of diplomatic
protocol. Linguistic features represented only part of this combined
culture, which developed further into the mid-eighteenth century. 37
Though members of both parties generally worked towards
the goal of mutual comprehension, in some situations errors were
unavoidable. Whether in informal or formal settings, at times
individuals did not want to understand others or to be understood
themselves. The deliberate failure to comprehend was not
restricted to either native or colonial representatives. There were
any number of motivations for willful misunderstandings, each
unique to the situation in which it occurred and the characters
involved. In his account of his 1750 journey to Onondaga in the
company of Conrad Weiser, Christian Daniel Claus recorded an
instance in which the group, once again lost in the woods, was
caught in a rainstorm with nightfall quickly approaching. Luckily,
36
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“we finally encountered 2 Indians. . . . Mr. Weiser inquired from
them whether this path led to Cornet Johnson’s but they did not
want to understand any of this.” 38 Weiser and his group were
eventually able to convince the Indians to provide directions to
Fort Hunter, but their initial reluctance could have stemmed from
several sources. Perhaps they were wary of the strangers and, as
they were outnumbered, feared for their personal safety. They
might have had previous unpleasant encounters with colonists and
hoped to avoid a repeat. If they were familiar with the colonial
representatives and their mission, they might have even had a
greater motivation in attempting to delay negotiations in any way
possible. Conversely, their confusion may have been entirely
genuine, as Claus was inexperienced in communication with
Indians and could have easily misjudged the situation.
Willful misunderstandings did not always ensue from
chance encounters, as evidenced in Witham Marshe’s Journal of
the Treaty Held with the Six Nations, June – July 1744. Marshe,
who served as scribe for the conferences and secretary to the
Maryland Treaty Commissioners, noted in his personal papers
Conrad Weiser’s directions for colonists who had the opportunity
to interact with the Iroquois representatives. 39 The interpreter
advised against outward remarks on Indians’ habits, speech, or
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physical appearance, warning that the Indians would take offense
since “most of them understood English, though they will not
speak it when they are in treaty.” 40 The Iroquois present at
Lancaster chose not to utilize their knowledge of the English
language within the context of the treaty negotiations, opting
instead to operate in their native tongue.

They might have been

hesitant about their own abilities and fearful of misspeaking, but it
is likely that custom had at least some part in their decision. In
Indian tradition, an appointed speaker often acted on behalf of
elders or officials to communicate a ruling to the group at large.
This individual might be particularly oratorically gifted or
practiced in the art of speech delivery. 41 Additionally, as Nancy
Hagedorn noted in her study of Indian interpreters as cultural
intermediaries, at a conference “Protocol entitled each party to
speak in its own language so all speeches had to be translated into
the language of the listeners by an interpreter.” 42 In this way, a
willful misunderstanding among Indians stemmed from traditions
and served not as an obstacle but as a mark of respect for all
involved and for the significance of the situation.
Just as listeners sometimes consciously chose which words
they would understand, speakers could be selective about those
they wanted to communicate. When interpretation was necessary,
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mediators had the responsibility and opportunity to alter and edit a
message for content before conveying it to the intended audience.
At times like these, the linguistic and cultural knowledge possessed
by those like Weiser, Montour, and Post became essential.
Through an interpreter’s intervention, representatives could avoid
issues ranging from a simple slip in etiquette to a potential
diplomatic disaster. 43
Putting their common interests ahead of personal gain,
translators worked together under fractious conditions. Post noted
this kind of cooperation in 1758 when he witnessed Tamaqua’s
rejection of a dispatch from an English general. The Shawnee
directed that the messenger “‘should go back over the mountains;
we have nothing to say to the contrary.’ Neither Mr. Croghn [sic]
nor Andrew Montour would tell Colonel Bouquet the Indians’
answer.” 44 Post and his negotiator colleagues George Croghan and
Andrew Montour met with colonial aggravation at their refusal, but
nevertheless seemingly felt justified in their decision to do what
they could in order to avert outright contention. Sir William
Johnson expressed a similar outlook in a 1757 letter, writing that
while he occasionally found he needed to amend exchanges, he
attempted to do so “without deviating from their meaning, because
I found them rather more animated than they often are, or than I
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desired.” 45 Most often, selective communication occurred in the
interest of preserving positive relations, rather than to further
personal interests. The potential for abuse by interpreters did exist,
emphasizing the need to identify reliable, trustworthy, and
competent individuals to serve in this capacity. 46
Selectivity in translation was not a quality restricted to
those in the employ of Pennsylvania. There was a strong historical
basis for this practice, dating to the mid-seventeenth century in
land arbitrations between the governors of New Sweden and the
Delaware Indians living in what would become Eastern
Pennsylvania. 47 The legacy of this diplomacy became clear as Post
conferred with Pisquetomen and other native companions in
preparation to depart Easton for Kushkushking on November 12,
1758. The interpreter requested the Indians’ cooperation as he
attempted to portray the Pennsylvania Provincial Council and
English military forces in as favorable a manner as possible. He
recollected a situation in which the roles were reversed,
remembering that “when I left Alleghenny I dropt all evil reports,
and only carried the agreeable news.” 48 The Delaware recognized
the influence a messenger could have in providing an account that
45
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came from an optimistic perspective or one that merely minimized
the likelihood of igniting controversy. These abridged reports were
not deliberately or maliciously misleading or incomplete; rather
when put in context, these were situations in which participants felt
the ends justified the means. In reference to his appeal for
assistance, Post recorded that his Indian allies “took it very
kindly,” signifying the atmosphere of solidarity that pervaded
among those in negotiating roles. 49 Regardless of mediators’ good
intentions and cross-cultural efforts to ease communication
difficulties, some incongruities posed even greater challenges.

A basic discrepancy between Indian and colonial cultures
was their usage and treatment of the written word. The effects of
this fundamental difference were pervasive, as evidenced in the
organization of a 1757 meeting between Six Nations Indians and
colonial officials. George Croghan, negotiator, translator, and
coordinator of the conference, described his preparations to the
Iroquois leaders, recalling that in order to contact Indian and
colonial participants, “I dispatched Messengers up Sasquehannah,
and to Ohio, and I wrote to your Brother, Sir William Johnson.”50
This twofold planning process, while involved, was necessary in
49
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order to properly observe the conventions of each culture, one
relying upon written and the other strictly verbal communication.
Residents of Pennsylvania, descended from the Western
European tradition, depended on textual records for a wide variety
of purposes. While literacy was far from universal, writing had an
important part in many spheres of colonial life and served as an
important channel of communication. 51 Authors could maintain
contact with individuals and groups both near and far through
mediums including private letters, public missives, newspapers,
pamphlets, and books. Additionally, official messages and treaties,
as well as personal accounts, journals, and letters by eyewitnesses
specifically addressed issues of intercultural relations and
translation between English and Indian languages.
Prior to contact with Europeans, most Indians were
unfamiliar with the concepts of alphabetical texts, since oral
tradition took precedence in their cultures.

Indians had

corresponding concerns to those of colonists, and similarly needed
to keep records of legislative, organizational, religious, and
familial matters, among others. Native accounts were preserved
verbally, rather than in writing, and transferred between
individuals through a careful and involved process of learning and
memorization. 52 It is important to note that a lack of written
language did not make Indians strictly illiterate – use of this term
51
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carries a negative connotation and implies a type of inadequacy as
it indicates one’s inability to read and write. It is more accurate to
characterize the native speakers of Algonquian and Iroquois
languages as nonliterate, a term which Nancy Hagedorn uses to
suggest that they simply had no need for reading or writing. 53
The preservation of records, messages, and news in an oral
sense clearly placed a considerable demand upon one’s memory.
The individuals entrusted with these responsibilities were called
upon to act as speakers at councils and other events when their
knowledge was pertinent. At such conferences, Indian listeners
placed great value on accuracy, freely expressing confirmation of
facts in support of an orator or vocalizing doubts when information
was disputable. 54 Colonial representatives on several occasions
noted the aptitude of Indian speakers, expressing surprise and
admiration at the extent of their capabilities. Claus, whose
inexperience in Indian ways once again inspired a frank and
informative report, noted that during the 1750 council at
Onondaga:
a speaker was chosen among these
councilors, who had to recite the
articles mentioned before in the
public assembly in the form of an
oration. . . . He had to learn the
different points verbatim by heart
and when he had nothing further to
53
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hand out, he continued to recite until
all the articles were read. 55
Veteran mediators like Weiser and Post were accustomed to Indian
practices of documentation, but for those like Claus it must have
been somewhat jarring to observe an Indian representative deliver
a lengthy recitation on detailed terms of negotiation entirely from
memory. Colonists generally saw Indian nonliteracy as a sign of
incompetence and questioned the accuracy of the messages they
delivered. Their opinions drew different responses from Indians,
some expressing reinforced confidence in their cultural traditions
and others beginning to doubt the legitimacy of oral recordkeeping,
especially in comparison to the advantages of written language.
In the spring of 1757, Indians attending a conference with
colonial representatives from Pennsylvania and New York had the
latter response. Over a month after the meetings began, an Oneida
sachem named Thomas King, along with his Mohawk allies,
prepared to deliver a response to the Pennsylvanian governor’s
proposals of the previous day. George Croghan noted that King
prefaced his speech by offering an anticipatory apology to his
audience, requesting their understanding if the Indians “should
make any Blunders, or have forgot any Part of the Speech . . . as
they could not write; therefore were obliged to keep every Thing in

55

Claus, The Journals of Christian Daniel Claus and Conrad Weiser, 44.

41

their Memory.” 56 This statement was atypical of general sentiment
among Indians but shows the effects interaction with doubtful
colonists had upon some of them. Susan Katler, editor of
Croghan’s Minutes of Conferences, postulated that King’s selfdeprecation stemmed from his interactions with Christian
missionaries who voiced misgivings about the Iroquois’ entirely
verbal methods of recordkeeping and communication. 57 Regardless
of the basis for his uncertainty, King’s comments are an example
of how cultural exchange, reactions, and responses on the
Pennsylvania frontier shaped attitudes and habits about language
use.
Mistrust of unfamiliar linguistic practices was not
restricted to colonists. Native Americans, who were by the late
seventeenth century largely acquainted with the concept of written
English, nevertheless remained cautious regarding its reliability.
Very few Indians could read, and as a result their opinions on
writing were complex and easily misinterpreted, even by those as
well-informed as Christian Frederick Post. 58 Twice in his 1758
journal, the interpreter remarked at the “jealousy” Indians
exhibited at colonists’ abilities to read and write. However, Post
56

Croghan, Minutes of Conferences, in Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania, and
the First Nations, 238.
57
Susan Katler, endnote in Minutes of Conferences, Held with the Indians, at
Harris’s Ferry, and at Lancaster, in March, April, and May, 1757, in Benjamin
Franklin, Pennsylvania, and the First Nations: the Treaties of 1736-62, ed.
Susan Katler (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), JSTOR, 254.
58
Post, The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, 252.

42

additionally observed that when he was called upon to compose a
letter to an English general on behalf of the Shawnee, “they were
afraid I would, at the same time, give other information, and this
perplexed them.” 59 While Post’s Indian allies may have been
“jealous” of his literacy, if only because they desired to write their
messages themselves, it is also significant that they were also both
“afraid” and “perplexed.” This mixed response demonstrates their
general wariness towards the written word and colonists’ use of it.
Unable to authenticate public or private communications or legal
documents on their own, Indians found themselves at a
disadvantage to literate colonists as they were forced to rely
completely on translators who displayed varying degrees of
trustworthiness.
Consequently, despite feeling uneasy about the topic, some
Indians expressed a desire to learn about and adopt written
language for diplomatic purposes. During a 1742 meeting with
colonial officials at Philadelphia, Six Nations delegates represented
both approaches.

60

The Iroquois insisted that the agreements

reached at the council be summarized in a signed document, as
they felt this option was more certain than a reliance solely on
colonial memory. However, in a subversive moment during
negotiations, Canassatego, an Onondaga sachem, reproached the
Maryland commissioners for their failure to honor a land deed
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signed over fifty years previously. 61 The Indian representatives
clearly recognized the functions and importance of written text, but
their inability to fully access or enforce its contents complicated
the situation.
This conflicted attitude dated back to the first decades of
Pennsylvania’s existence. Indian concerns were justified, as
illustrated by a conflict that arose in the spring of 1700 between
colonists and native residents living outside Lancaster. 62 In May,
Shawnee leaders Connoodaghtoh and Meealloua contacted
William Penn to protest the actions of colonial vigilantes in
imprisoning four unidentified Indians, who were possibly runaway
servants of families in New York. The Indians accused that the
previous fall, two colonists “produced a paper with a large Seale
and pretendednded it was a warrant From the goverr For to require
them to deliver the said Indians.” Suspicious of these credentials
and unwilling to abandon those under his protection, Meealloua
demanded further proof that Penn had given permission for the
arrests. Returning later with reinforcements, including one man
who claimed to be second in command to Penn, the colonists
“produced another paper with a large seale and againe demanded
the said Indians in the governours name.” 63 The Indians remained
61
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unconvinced; their continued refusal to cooperate led to an
atmosphere of tension and threats of violence that inspired their
appeal to the proprietor.
The contents of this source are telling, demonstrating that
Indians who worried about being taken advantage of through
counterfeit documents or inaccurate translations, as mentioned in
Post’s account, were justified in their apprehensions. However, the
existence of the source itself offers an opportunity for
interpretation. The fact that two native representatives chose to
contact Penn in writing just two decades after the colony’s
establishment shows Indian recognition of the medium’s
consequence early on. Unfortunately, there is little evidence
available concerning the composition of this message. It seems
unlikely that it was physically penned by the leaders themselves, as
the letter closes with a note referring to “Conodahto marke” and
“The marke of Meealloua” rather than the men’s signatures,
suggesting that they, like most Indians, were nonliterate. 64 The
clerical mistakes, grammatical inconsistencies, and lack of
standardized spelling within the document hint that the writer was
not highly skilled or well-practiced as a scribe.
With no direct mentions of language, it is unclear whether
the English words were chosen by Connoodaghtoh and Meealloua
or by an anonymous translator on their behalf.
64
65

Ibid., 601.
Ibid., 601.

45

65

Still, the pair

were aware of the immediacy of their situation and understood that
alerting Penn with a written document was a viable and efficient
option. They therefore accessed what resources they had in order
to produce the letter. Their actions make them an example of the
group of Indians who, regardless of their personal feelings about
English written text, chose to adopt and employ this colonial
practice for their own ends, contributing to the larger systems of
linguistic exchange occurring at the time.
Indians attempted to use English writing for different
reasons and with varying results. Some might have seen
acceptance of the system as a way to increase their status or
credibility in colonial opinion. For others, it was less a matter of
choice – if they hoped to be able to fully understand English law,
terms of treaties, and correspondence, they would have to assent
and conform to foreign standards. 66 An example of the inconsistent
situation Indians faced, as well as their varying responses, can be
gathered from different accounts of the signing of the Lancaster
Treaty of 1744. Within the official, published account of the
conferences, the Six Nations deputies are depicted as cautious of
written text and vigilant of its documentation, yet willing to invoke
it in support of their cause. When the governor of Virginia made
reference to a letter of several years earlier that authorized the sale
of Indian land, the Onondoga delegation responded with a demand
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to see the letter itself, as well as to be provided information on its
supposed authors and interpreters. 67 Though unable to read the
letter, the Six Nations officials were clearly both skeptical of its
origins and aware of its importance. Determined not to let a lack of
information harm their chances of reaching a fair settlement with
the colonies, they took what steps they could to authenticate the
Virginian claims with textual evidence.
In both official and informal settings, Indians who began to
make the shift toward usage of written language demonstrated
engagement with texts and eagerness to understand them, tempered
with a concern for accuracy in interpretation and honesty from
colonial officials. Outwardly, these interests were not always
apparent, as in 1744 at Lancaster. Observing a land transfer,
Witham Marshe, the young Maryland secretary, commented in his
journal that “several chiefs, who had not signed the deed of release
. . . did now cheerfully, and without any hesitation.” 68 To casual
observers like Marshe, it might have seemed as though the
Iroquois did not grasp the significance of signing the deed, or that
they were unconcerned with the particulars of the agreement.
Behind the scenes, however, the process was more complicated, as
Indians were careful to keep themselves informed and consulted
with those colonists they knew well and trusted before committing
to any written document. Conrad Weiser, one such individual,
67
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described Indians’ interest in physical documents in his account of
a 1743 journey to Onondaga. Carrying messages from the
Pennsylvanian and Virginian governors to the Six Nations, Weiser
was somewhat surprised when approached by a small group of
Indian leaders, who asked him to explain the messages rather than
only delivering them to the council in the traditional form of
presentation, so that they might better understand and form a
response. 69 This exchange represented another instance in which
an interpreter acted as a resource to Indians, serving not only as a
translator but as a cultural mediator, in this case specifically on
linguistic issues. 70
Indians increasingly expressed the desire to gain familiarity
with written language into the mid-eighteenth century. A few even
learned how to read and write themselves, demonstrating the extent
of their knowledge of the English language. At a treaty council
between Delawares and Pennsylvanian colonists held at Easton in
1756, the Indian interpreter John Pumpshire worked with
Teedyuscung, the notorious Delaware representative, among
others. Pumpshire, also known as Cawkeeponen, merited acclaim
for his skills from both participating groups. His interpretation
abilities were not restricted to the spoken word, as on July 1, he
wrote a letter to an English captain at Fort Allen on behalf of
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Captain Newcastle, a representative for the Iroquois. 71
By

writing

this

letter,

Pumpshire

personified

the

contemporary cultural exchange in written language between
Pennsylvania’s Indians and colonists. Through his communication
of the message for Newcastle, Pumpshire echoed Indian oratorical
traditions that identified performance and the use of a secondary
speaker as conventional symbols of respect. In his use of the
English language, written text, and even the physical materials
used to compose the letter such as paper and ink, the Delaware
implemented elements of colonial culture, whether consciously or
not. At the close of the message to the English officer, Pumpshire
signed his name, while the nonliterate Newcastle provided his
mark. 72 The actions of these Indians were a tangible demonstration
of the ways in which individuals, languages, and cultures
converged to influence communication in colonial Pennsylvania.

This letter and the method of its composition exemplified,
albeit on a small scale, the attempts at unification of Indian and
European linguistic customs, written and spoken, that was taking
place across Pennsylvania at the time. Both natives and colonists
recognized the authority of and opportunities that a new system of
communication, distinct from those that had existed previously,
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could offer.

73

Despite the efforts of notable figures, respected

mediators, and individuals determined to convey their thoughts and
opinions to those of different cultural backgrounds, basic
disparities in language created momentous challenges to the
development of a common form of interaction. Motivated by
necessity, residents of the colony found flawed ways to manage
issues of interpreting spoken and written language. Ultimately, the
incongruence

between

Indian

and

colonial

methods

of

communication was a major contributing factor to the diplomatic
difficulties these two cultures experienced.
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Creating a Statesman: The Early Life of Prince
Clemens von Metternich and its Effect on His
Political Philosophy
By
Ryan Nadeau
~

~

A Timeline of Key Events in Metternich’s Early Life

1773: Metternich born in Coblenz, the Archbishopric of Trier, to
Francis George and Maria Beatrice von Metternich.

1786: Friedrich Simon becomes his private tutor.

1788: Enrollment at Strasbourg University until 1790; Studies
under Koch.

1789: Outbreak of revolution in France; Looting of Strasbourg by
revolutionaries; Refugee French aristocrats take up
residence in Coblenz and the surrounding Rhineland.

1790: Coronation of Emperor Francis II; Enrollment at Mainz
University until 1793; Studies under Vogt.
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1792: Coronation of Emperor Leopold II; Prussian army in
Coblenz; Prussia army defeated at Valmy.

1793: Fall of Mainz; Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette executed in
France; Beginning of the Reign of Terror; Metternich to
Brussels; Capture of Valenciennes.

1794: Mission to Great Britain; Fall of the Austrian Netherlands;
Fall of Coblenz; Relocation to Vienna.

The nineteenth century in Europe was a period defined
politically by competing empires and revolutions of political
thought, characterized by brilliant statesmen whose influence could
be felt across the continent and changed the course of nations. One
of these statesmen was Prince Clemens von Metternich, who the
historical record remembers as one of the Austrian Empire’s
greatest diplomats and one of Europe’s

most infamous

archconservatives. Fulfilling both of these roles, Metternich is the
man most frequently viewed as the chief facilitator of the Concert
of Europe – the system of international cooperation and
negotiation following the Napoleonic wars designed to maintain
the European balance of power and to uphold the integrity of the
continent’s monarchies. These principles defined his nearly fiftyyears of policy making. Having entered Austria’s diplomatic
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service as a young man at the dawn of the century, he quickly
made a name for himself during the aftermath of the Napoleonic
Wars due to his central role at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, where
he helped redraw the borders of Europe and re-establish the old
monarchal order. Throughout his long career, he established
himself as a committed opponent of revolutionary activity,
liberalism, and nationalism, always working to maintain the
strength of Europe’s traditional empires – especially in his adopted
home of Austria. His career concluded in 1848 when Austria, like
Europe as a whole, faced liberal uprisings on a scale which could
only barely be contained, signaling the end of Metternich’s age of
conservatism.
Despite his illustrious career, under no circumstances did
Metternich simply spring from the ground, destined to guide the
progression of history. He was instead entirely the product of his
society. His family was one of prosperous Rhenish nobles wellintegrated into the imperial mechanisms of the Holy Roman
Empire and strongly influenced by aristocratic French culture. His
education focused on history and science, and occurred
concurrently with the French Revolution, the excesses of which
Metternich bore witness to on more than one occasion. Most
Metternich biographers pay little attention to these formative years,
instead spending far more time studying the man that he would
become and his political legacy. This, however, minimizes the
importance of a crucial stage of development in humans: the early
57

and formative years, in which frequently lie the seeds of future
actions. A study of Metternich’s background and early life can
help to explain the development of his later philosophies as natural
developments of the cultural, intellectual, and political forces
which surrounded him.
To understand how exactly the past defines the future,
however, a firm grip must be held on what exactly the future
entails, or in this case, Metternich’s political philosophy. With
broad strokes, his doctrines can be divided into three key
principles: the balance of power, legitimacy, and conservatism,
each one explaining and reinforcing the others. Self-evident as per
its label, the balance of power principle dictates the need for a
political and military equilibrium among between European
nations, designed to prevent the domination of any single state
over any other. The desire to conquer and rule Europe as a
hegemon was a very real ambition for European leaders prior to
the Congress of Vienna. Wars of containment had been fought
against rising powers for centuries: first against the Habsburg
dynasty in the Thirty Years’ War, then against Louis XIV’s
France, and finally against Napoleon. According to Henry
Kissinger, “[The balance-of-power system] was meant to limit
both the ability of states to dominate others and the scope of
conflicts. Its goal was not peace so much as stability and
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moderation.” 74 Ultimately, this was Metternich’s goal, as not only
would a non-Austrian hegemon naturally rival his empire, but war,
as he saw it, was uncontrollable. He expounded on this point in
1821, writing that “once it [had] begun laws are no longer imposed
by the will of man but by force of circumstance.” 75 A balance of
power thus kept wars in Europe under control and maintained
societal stability, avoiding the catastrophic situations which had
characterized the past two-hundred years.
Rounding that principle out are the principles of legitimacy
and conservativism, which can be seen as nearly inseparable. The
first demands support for the monarchical regimes of Europe, no
matter the circumstances. The second opposes sweeping liberal
political reform in the style that the French Revolution had aimed
for. According to Metternich, monarchy was the very symbol of
law and order in Europe from which all laws emanated. As such,
he believed in supporting them not because of a divine right, but
because failing to do so would undermine the entire continent’s
social order, leading to chaos. Revolutionaries and reformers that
would severely limit the power of monarchs or overthrow them
altogether were thus to be rigorously opposed by all European
states for that very reason. If revolution seized control of a
monarchical state, then European monarchs were to intervene to
74

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks,
1994), 18, 57-59, 70-72, 75-77.
75
G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Metternich and his Times (London: Darton,
Longman, & Todd, 1962), 69.

59

restore order, as a protection of their very own legitimacy. 76 Thus,
the three principles of Metternich’s philosophy were rooted in the
fundamentally pragmatic goal of maintaining the rule of law and
keeping Europe generally in order by maintaining both
international and domestic stasis.
Historians
motivations

disagree

reflect

upon

on

how

these

his

personal

principles

character,

and

though

undertaking research on Metternich’s life and philosophy in the
English language is a problematic task. Several influential studies
of his life and character, such as Heinrich Ritter von Srbik’s 1925
biographical masterpiece Metternich der Staatsmann und der
Mensch, remain untranslated from their original language.
Additionally, while Richard von Metternich’s Memoirs of Prince
Metternich,

a

compilation

of

his

father’s

uncompleted

autobiography and letters remains a valuable first-hand account of
the statesman’s life, it is by no means a complete collection of
Metternich sources, with numerous letters and documents
remaining untranslated. Commenting on this situation, French
biographer Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny remarked that “the
historiography on Metternich in English is markedly less plentiful
than that in French and still less than that in German. The English
edition of the Memoires et Documents of the prince de Metternich
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is only half the size of the German and French editions.” 77 While
much English biography has emerged utilizing superior French and
German resources, until greater interest is taken in translating the
entire collection of Metternich documents from their native
languages, scholarship on him which relies solely on English
sources will lack the full breadth of resources that could be
available. Such is the predicament faced by this very study of
Metternich’s early life—though not one which will diminish the
validity of the conclusions drawn through available resources.
Generally, English sources can be divided into three broad
categories: those written before the First World War, those written
in the interwar period, and those written following the Second
World War, which reflect the changing views of Metternich’s
character over time.
Published in 1888, Colonel George Bruce Malleson’s Life
of Prince Metternich was one of the earliest Metternich
biographies available in English. Written only eight years after
Richard von Metternich’s published his Memoirs, Malleson’s
biography relied heavily on it as a resource. In many places, he
simply rephrased and restated the account of Metternich’s early
life as recorded within the Memoirs, making little effort to analyze
the events of that period.
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Sandeman wrote little more on the subject, despite the greater
length of his text overall. 79 Both ultimately shared the same
eventual conclusion on Metternich as well: that he was a deeply
flawed individual with an overall negative impact on European
history. For his part, Malleson portrayed Metternich as the
architect of “velvet-gloved despotism,” who single-handedly kept
nationalism subdued for decades. Sandeman, however, took the
opposite stance, arguing that Metternich in fact was little more
than a political opportunist whose success entirely rested upon his
personal charm rather than on any concrete political ideology, and
thus to see him as a Machiavellian schemer is foolish. 80 As pre-war
authors, both Malleson and Sandeman were emblematic of the
hostility still maintained toward Metternich on principle.
Liberalism and nationalism were the popular ideologies of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and thus very few had any
desire to give serious consideration to the ultimate opponent of
both. 81 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that both authors
were deeply influenced by this universal hostility, finding little
value in understanding the development of a man whom they only
saw in a negative fashion.
With the First World War, however, came a reassessment
of Metternich. Many viewed the war’s destruction as a product of
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nationalistic thought. With alternatives to liberalism concurrently
growing in popularity, Metternich’s legacy and character began to
be looked at differently. Nostalgia for the peaceful days of the
Concert of Europe almost seemed to be propagated, inverting the
old negative views, as this was the period in which von Srbik’s
1925 biography became the most radically revisionist and positive
view of Metternich since his death. In it, von Srbik discarded the
old characterizations and portrayed Metternich as a brilliant and
coherent statesman worthy of respect. 82 In English, Algernon Cecil
followed von Srbik’s lead, and while he gave a much more positive
treatment than previous authors, he was once more not one who
possessed a highly insightful view into Metternich’s formative
years, going little further than imaginative and unresolved
speculation on the effect they may have had on the statesman.
Perhaps the currents of revisionism went too far, with historians of
this time now too interested in praising Metternich’s supposed
genius rather than determining from whence it came. Still, interwar
historians were able to break the stigma surrounding his legacy,
allowing future historians to study him seriously, rather than
writing him off as a dead and buried political boogeyman. 83
It is perhaps only since the Second World War that
historians have regarded Metternich more objectively rather than
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through lenses tinted by political dispute. The year 1959 marked
the one-hundredth anniversary of Metternich’s death, yet not a
single one of the Empires that he had tried to balance remained,
with imperialism grossly out of style. These developments
reflected how far the world had come since the days of Metternich
and benefited historians dethatching themselves personally from
the statesman’s ideas without the clouding effects of national pride
or political grudges. In 1952, Constantin de Grunwald seriously
questioned the role of Metternich’s teachers on his political
development, delving into details on their scholarly specialties
from the Memoirs that previous biographers had virtually
ignored. 84 Much later, in 1991, Desmond Seward paid deep
attention to Metternich’s often glossed-over early career as an
assistant to his father, the imperial envoy to the Austrian
Netherlands, and that experience’s effect on his own career. 85
Even earlier, and perhaps at long last, Alan Palmer’s 1972
biography had finally come to admit the need to understand
Metternich’s early life on a more than superficial level in order to
fully understand the man that he would become. 86 Furthermore, all
three authors offered nuanced analyses of his character that
captured both the good and the bad inherent in a man as dynamic
as Metternich had been, demonstrating a level of biographical
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sophistication that is perhaps only obtainable with sufficient
temporal distance from the subject, especially with one so
controversial. As such, it is these modern biographies that are most
useful in understanding the early life of Metternich, and whose
even-handed, honest, and detailed investigation of their subject is
best followed in future studies such as this.
Ultimately, all Metternich biographers must start at the
very beginning, whether they delve deeply into the implications of
it or not: the circumstances of his birth. Metternich was born in the
Rhenish city of Coblenz on 15 May, 1773, to Francis George von
Metternich and his wife, Maria Beatrice von Kageneck. 87 At this
time, Francis was a highly active diplomat in the service of various
Holy Roman states and their Habsburg overlords, holding, at
various points in his life, titles such as chamberlain to both the
Archbishops of Trier and Mainz, minister at the imperial court, and
imperial ambassador to the Rhenish electorates and Austrian
Netherlands. 88 Time spent in the Austrian capital of Vienna as a
young man in the 1760s had won him the attention of both the
legendary state chancellor Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz as well as
the Empress Maria Theresa. The two ultimately helped negotiate
his marriage to Maria Beatrice, a vivacious noblewoman in the
Empress’s favor who hailed from Austria-controlled Bohemia. 89
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The Metternichs themselves were, by this point, already a
distinguished family, having produced several archbishops of both
Mainz, where the Counts von Metternich had traditionally served
as hereditary chamberlain, and Trier, under whose authority the
family estate at Coblenz lay. As Mainz and Trier were members of
the imperial electorate well connected to the Austrian hegemony,
the Metternichs’ own connections to them ensured they remained a
relevant, if minor, family. 90 By Metternich’s own words, it was the
courtly machinations of both his parents which led to his
engagement to his first wife, Eleonore von Kaunitz, the
granddaughter of the state chancellor. 91
Despite ending his career in professional disgrace due to
his untimely oversight of the Austrian Netherlands at the time of
their fall to revolutionary French forces, Francis von Metternich
left a profound legacy on his son. Cynically dismissive of the
revolutionary political upheaval of the time, he maintained the firm
belief that “this business will work out one way or another, like
everything else,” a phrase which Metternich himself could have
uttered in reference to revolution and his unshakable faith in the
authority of monarchy. Francis won the trust of the Habsburg
emperors with his honesty and loyalty, securing his family’s
position in their favor even after the destruction of his diplomatic
90
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career. 92 While physically described as being “as heavily German
as the Hanoverian Georges,” by Palmer, it seems more fair to
borrow a phrase from Cecil, that “not the light beer of Vienna but
the sparkling wine of the Rhineland ran in the veins of the
Metternichs,” upon reflecting on his personal behavior. 93 Francis
was a figure emblematic of the “French social life and moral laxity
which characterized the smaller German States,” in Metternich’s
own words. 94 The phrases stately, prim, pleasure-loving, frivolous,
and spend-thrift have all been used to describe the elder
Metternich, and conjure images strikingly similar to those
associated with the French aristocrats themselves on the eve of the
Revolution. His amiable dismissiveness of revolutionary forces
only completes the comparison. 95 Maria Beatrice, while hailing
from the east of the imperial lands, helped enforce these French
overtones. Profoundly ambitious, she piled her affections and
attention onto young Clemens, raising him to become a master of
“the art of pleasing,” the French language, and “the graces which
the old society of France and the parts of Europe adjacent had
brought to perfection.” 96 He was the child upon which the family’s
hopes were poured, and so he was to perfect the traits which had
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brought his parents success. These are the very traits which
brought him diplomatic success later in life.
Certainly, surrounded as he was by Rhenish society,
Metternich’s development as a charming aristocrat in the French
style was to be expected. In 1773, the Elector and Archbishop of
Trier, Clemens Wenzeslaus was both the uncle of King Louis XVI
of France and the man for whom Metternich would be named. His
appointment as archbishop was designed to solidify the new
alliance between the French Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs. 97
At this time, however, Trier was more commonly known by its
French

name

of

Treves—strongly

archbishopric leaned culturally.
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telling
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where

the

“Cosmopolitanism,” states

modern Rhineland expert Michael Rowe, “acted as an antidote to
the stifling localism and bigotry” of the region,” where there was a
craving for news on foreign improvements which might be applied
locally,” where there was perhaps no more cosmopolitan state than
nearby France. France’s influence was felt in numerous tangible
fields, such as the adoption of French economic practices, social
club structure, and political and social journals. 99 The Rhineland
thus served as a veritable melting pot of German and French
influences, politically tied to Germany and the Habsburgs, but with
97
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its heart held by France, a description which fits Metternich just as
well as the region itself. That Metternich became such a staunch
enemy to the Revolution is then entirely unsurprising, for the goals
of the Revolution called for the destruction of this courtly culture
which he had grown up with. One could ascribe Metternich’s
philosophical development to a visceral self-defense of his way of
life, and while that may be sufficient explanation if one is to
assume that he was motivated entirely by personal reasons, it
seems unable to completely account for the consistency of
Metternich’s principles and the question of why they formed
specifically as they did. To find the answer to that, one must turn
to a new facet of Metternich’s early development: his education.
Metternich’s education, while rarely commented on by the
man himself, was incredibly diverse. Befitting his status as a
nobleman in the Rhineland region, which boasted the highest
literacy in Europe during the late eighteenth century and served as
a center of the Catholic Enlightenment, he received comprehensive
instruction from several tutors and leading universities. 100 Among
his tutors, whom Metternich pays special attention to in his
Memoir, was Friedrich Simon, a disciple of the educators Johann
Bernhard Basedow and Joachim Heinrich Cample, pioneers of the
philanthropist school of education that was “in vogue” at the time
of Metternich’s childhood.
100
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“natural” education, where children were to be engaged as children
rather than small adults, with emphasis placed on the teaching of
“natural” subjects, such as chemistry, natural science, history, and
commerce. 102 After joining Simon in his native city of Strasbourg
in 1788, two years into his tutelage, Metternich’s education was
supplemented by lectures from the city’s university. 103 It is here
that he received instruction from a man only recorded today as
“Professor Koch,” a lecturer on German law who specialized in the
study of the Treaty of Westphalia. 104 Attendance at the University
of Mainz 105 later in his life brought him to study under Nicolas
Vogt, the official historian of the Empire, who became one of
Metternich’s “most zealous friends.” 106 In lectures inspired by
philosophers such as Leibniz, Wolff, and Vattel, Vogt argued that
the “greatest goal of a truly enlightened society is the education of
all men as to the importance of the maintenance of [the] balance
among both nations and individuals,” language later found in
Metternich’s own ideas. 107 The scientific studies Metternich likely
received from Simon never left him: as late as 1796, Metternich
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firmly believed that his “particular vocation seemed to me to be the
cultivation of knowledge, especially of the exact and physical
Sciences, which suited my taste particularly… The diplomatic
career might certainly flatter my ambition, but during all my life I
have never been accessible to this feeling.” “Man and his life
seemed to me to be objects worthy of study,” he went on to write
in reference to his diligent attendance of lectures on geology,
chemistry, physics, and medicine in Vienna in 1797. 108
These quotes, curiously, have gone almost completely
ignored by Metternich’s biographers in English, despite the fact
that they provide essential windows into the mindset he must have
formed. The greatest scientist of the eighteenth century, of whom
Metternich must have read, was Isaac Newton. Newton, even as an
Englishman, dominated German scientific thinking in the
eighteenth century. 109 It was Newtonian physics which gave birth
to Newtonian optimism, a staunchly conservative moral-scientific
philosophy which supplanted mathematical rationality upon
hypothetical realities, arguing that a logical and reasonable God
had created a world which obeyed unbreakable logical rules. As
such, the world was one which functioned in obedience of a natural
order, with the most optimistic thinkers believing that as the
creator God certainly obeyed the same rationality of the world he
108

von Metternich, Memoirs, vol. 1, 23.
Thomas P. Saine, The Problem of Being Modern: or, The German Pursuit of
Enlightenment from Leibniz to the French Revolution (Detriot: Wayne State
University Press, 1997), 29.
109

71

created, then the world known had to be the best of all possible
worlds. A world which was not the best would be illogical to
create, after all. 110 This is the sort of thinking most often associated
with

the

philosopher

Gottfried

Leibniz—a

philosophical

inspiration for Metternich’s friend and mentor, Professor Vogt.
Koch, meanwhile, was a Westphalian expert. The Treaty of
Westphalia was that which had created the concept of equality and
sovereignty among nations, resolving the great European conflict
of the seventeenth century which had been, in many ways, caused
by both political and religious power imbalances within the Holy
Roman Empire. 111
These are the factors which gave birth to Metternich’s
substantive belief in the necessity of a balance of power. Historical
evidence suggested that an imbalance would lead to war and
ruination. The concept of states as solidified political entities fully
in control of their own affairs made the idea of balancing them off
each other that much more logical, as they could be understood as
concrete units rather than the quasi-sovereign ones interconnected
among a strange hierarchy previously active in the Holy Roman
Empire. Philosophically and scientifically, as per the reasoning of
the day, a natural order seemed to exist within the world which
made it the best of all possible worlds: why then could the same
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principle not be applied to the political world, where a balance of
forces would bring about peace, and thus prosperity? Henry
Kissinger himself admits to the Enlightenment connection of the
balance of power philosophy in European politics, with that
legendary Metternich expert von Srbik himself viewing Metternich
as a “systematizer of the state and social order” who had an
“exceedingly strong impulse to search beyond the phenomena of
the mental and physical world for lawlike regularities and then in
the factual realm to test them empirically and experimentally and
prove them right.” 112 Metternich and his career can thus be viewed,
perhaps, as the last great hurrah of the proponents of natural social
order, whose political goals stemmed from the desire to bring
rational harmony to a disorderly world.
Thus, Metternich was given the intellectual backing for his
emotional opposition to revolution. The final question that must be
asked, then, is what events codified his association between natural
order, peace, and monarchy—and in the inverse, between
revolution and chaos? The answer can be largely derived from his
own mouth. In 1790, Metternich was present in Frankfurt for the
coronation of Emperor Leopold II, which he would remember as
“one of the most impressive and splendid spectacles in the world.
Everything, down to the most trifling details, spoke to the mind
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and heart through the force of tradition…” Comparing this to the
reports of violence already pouring out of France, where revolution
had broken out the year before, Metternich only saw “with all the
force of youthful impressions, the contrast between the country
contaminated by Jacobinism, and the country where human
grandeur was united with a noble national spirit.” The contrast was
set even deeper only two years later, at the coronation of Francis II,
which Metternich also attended, when violence in France had
escalated even further. By that time, war had been declared on
Austria, with the violent excesses of the Reign of Terror just on the
horizon. 113 Shortly after, while curiously silent in regards to Louis
XVI’s 1793 execution, the execution of Marie Antoinette later that
year brought forth Metternich’s first political writing. In an open
letter, he furiously condemned the action, angrily declaring to the
Empire’s citizens that “the blood of your immortal [Maria]
THERESA, the blood of AUSTRIA herself, [has been] spilled
upon a scaffold!!!” “Ruin fall upon the heads of those impious
murderers, murderers of their kings and of their Fatherland,” he
further elaborated, with a measure more of self-control. 114 As a
loyal servant of the Empire, whose parents and family had made
their fortune in the service of the Habsburg emperors, and whose
concept of tradition and order was firmly tied to imperial dignity,
his anger was certainly justified.
113
114

von Metternich, Memoirs, vol. 1, 7-8, 12; Rowe, From Reich to State, 48.
von Metternich, Memoirs, vol. 1, 339.

74

Furthermore, the Revolution would not stay a distant
enemy, for Metternich’s Rhineland lay directly within its path.
From the outset of France’s troubles in 1789, aristocrats fleeting
for their lives poured over the border into the empire’s
principalities, establishing courts in exile in the Rhineland with a
center at Coblenz—Metternich’s own home city. While tensions
ran high between the French and local citizens, Metternich fully
immersed himself within their society, proclaiming that he had
“learned to estimate the difficulty of erecting a society on new
foundations, when the old are destroyed,” from the exiles, likely
only fully reinforcing his previously established aristocratically
inclined sensibilities. 115 By 1792, Coblenz and the surrounding
cities and towns 116 also became the staging ground for the Prussian
counterattack against French aggression. 117 From then on, the
Revolution, in all its fury, consumed the major locations of
Metternich’s youth. Strasbourg, where he had studied under the
care of Simon and Koch, had already been plundered by
revolutionary forces in 1789—an event he had been present to see.
Mainz, where he had studied under Professor Vogt and which
hosted, in Metternich’s words, the most luxurious court in all of
Germany, fell in the opening months of 1793 after the Prussian
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defeat at Valmy. 118 Mainz’s fall then meant that his education
there was at an abrupt end, and so he traveled to Brussels, where
his father served as imperial minister. There, he witnessed the 1793
capturing of the French border city of Valenciennes by coalition
troops. Though he would ultimately earn a reprieve from the chaos
surrounding him with a visit to Great Britain on behest of his
father’s government, he would not return to the Netherlands, for
they too would fall in the revolutionaries’ counter-attack while he
remained abroad – and with them fell Francis George’s political
career. 119 The worst was yet to come, however, and did in October
of 1794 when revolutionary forces seized Coblenz itself, and with
it, the Metternich family estate. 120 And so the entire world which
Metternich had known in his twenty-one years thus far was swept
away by men who, in his mind, seemed intent on destroying both
his society and his way of life. “I cannot bear the idea of seeing my
home in the hands of those rogues,” he would write in a letter in
December of that year. “According to my way of seeing things,
everything has gone to the devil; and the time is come when
everyone must save from the wreck what we can.” 121
With Coblenz and the Austrian Netherlands gone, the
Metternich family moved to take up residence in Vienna as exiles
– marking the first time he had actually seen the imperial capital.
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And while it would be several years before his first permanent
appointment as an official of the Austrian diplomatic service,
Metternich’s philosophy and mindset was sealed. Here was a man
who had grown up the model of a diplomatic and cosmopolitan
aristocrat, surrounded by imperial traditions which served to
uphold order within the world he knew, forced to bear direct
witness to the violent overthrow of that entire system and the
physical world that embodied it. Thus, while the intellectual
origins of Metternich’s philosophy can be clearly traced to the
influences of the men who educated him, it was the Revolution
itself which defined them and gave them direction. The principle
of the balance of power can be seen as the desire to restore natural
order to the world, for the Revolution and its wars had thrown
Europe out of balance, resulting in lawlessness, destruction, and
chaos, which he bore witness to. Only a return to a political
balance would allow for a return to order and lawfulness, in
Metternich’s approximation. The principle of legitimacy was
reflected in the same way, for with the overthrow of the French
monarchy had come chaos, death, and war, while the staunchlyimperial Holy Roman Empire remained a bastion of tranquility, as
symbolized in its coronations. And the principle of conservatism is
the insurance that none of this would ever happen again, for as
long as the coronations occurred as they should, order would be
maintained. Synthesizing all of this information, it becomes more
surprising to entertain the thought that Metternich would not
77

become the diplomat that he did under these circumstances than to
reflect upon the fact that a minor Rhenish noble such as he rose so
high into the halls of history.
While studying in Mainz, Professor Vogt gave Metternich a
piece of advice which, by the man’s own admission, he would hold
dear for the rest of his life. Almost prophetic in the image it
conjures, one must wonder if Metternich remembered it
apocryphally. Allegedly, Vogt told Metternich that:

Your intellect and your heart on the
right road; preserve therein also in
practical life, the lessons of History
will guide you. Your career, however
long it may be, will not enable you to
see the end of the conflagration
which is destroying the great
neighboring kingdom. If you do not
wish to expose yourself to
reproaches, never leave the straight
path. You will see many so-called
great men pass by you with swift
strides; let them pass, but do not
deviate from your path. You will
overtake them, if only because you
must meet them on their way
back! 122
This is the image of Metternich that should be constructed as he
moved out of his youth and into his professional career: that of a
122
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man boldly walking forward, not deviating from his path even as
great men passed him (Napoleon, perhaps), for soon enough he
would be overtaking them. Metternich, as has been stated, was not
a man who made up the rules as he went along in the political
game. He knew who he was and what he believed in, and based his
politics on such. His development as a politician is easily traceable
by closely examining his early life. It is by recognizing this
development and by learning just what this past was that one can
come to see him as a very human figure. He was not one sinisterly
bent on subjugating Europe, nor an immaculate genius, but rather a
man who sought to restore and preserve a world that he firmly
believed to be a good and natural one and that was, in his mind,
completely opposed by the revolutionary movement.
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Virtus and the Roman World: Generality,
Specificity, and Fluidity
By
Kyle Schrader
~

~

I. Introduction
Scholars frequently debate the meanings of classical words
that do not necessarily have direct modern language parallels.
Words like the Greek othismos and the Latin virtus are poorly
understood, and modern scholars strive to provide these words
with specific definitions. The Romans saw their virtus, a term often
inadequately translated as the English word “virtue,” as a major
factor in their conquest of the Mediterranean. In this context, the
Romans focused on their military virtus, a term that includes
numerous intricacies of Roman combat ideology but can be
simplified by the translation “martial courage.” However, the
Romans also used virtus to describe men, women and objects off
the battlefield, and in these cases virtus can also exhibit the
adjectival qualities of the English word “excellence.”
These two uses of the term virtus are oversimplifications
though. Donald Earl presented virtus as a word defining a
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multitude of complex physical and moral ideas and practices. 123
While many more modern scholars oppose Earl’s view, it is clear
that the term virtus does not necessarily define anything specific.
Instead, the context gives virtus its meaning. The multitude of
times virtus appears in the Latin lexicon, as well as the numerous
different connotations and situations the word is found in, suggest
a more broad usage of the term than modern scholars care to
admit. 124 From the literary sources available, three primary uses of
virtus appear: a more general one meaning “excellence,” and two
more specific meanings revolving around the battlefield and
aristocratic competition in the Roman Republic.

II. Virtus as a General Term
Virtus was often used in military histories, accounts, and
other such documents to describe a soldier or general’s actions on
and recently off the battlefield. Virtus is also frequently found in
poetry, theatre, and philosophical writings. One of the most famous
of the non-military uses of the word virtus is in Cato’s De
Agricultura, where Cato claims that the best land has natural
virtus. 125 Some scholars contribute this usage of virtus to Greek
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influence over the Latin vocabulary. 126 If this was true, virtus
should have lost, or at least changed, its original, more military
meanings based on Greek influence as well, which, with evidence
from later and contemporary military documents, is certainly not
the case. Myles McDonnell, a modern proponent of the Greekinfluence theory, suggests that all uses of virtus in Roman plays are
simply mis-translated versions of the Greek term for excellence,
ἀῥἐῐᾐ. 127 Further, the other uses of virtus in this way (such as
Cato’s usage in De Agricultura), according to McDonnell, can be
attributed to a similar blending of the two different words that may
have occurred during the Pyrrhic War. 128 McDonnell uses these
arguments to attempt to explain away these general uses of virtus,
and yet, even if the linguistic blending did occur, these uses still
existed.
There is another possibility to explain these usages of
virtus: perhaps these Roman writers were simply speaking
metaphorically or with a sort of hyperbole. Classical scholars often
see the word virtus and assume it is being used literally; in
comedic theatre it is more likely the word would have been used
ironically, and in other writings, such as Cato’s, the word virtus
may have appeared so that a more general audience could
understand the meaning. Ancient sources cannot always be
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translated verbatim, no more than any modern languages can be
translated fully into another language due to metaphors,
euphemisms, idioms, and other cultural and linguistic tools.
The Roman comedies of Plautus frequently use virtus in
both military and non-military contexts. In Plautus’ Asinaria, a
slave recounts his own virtus involved in his acceptance of his
position in life, including his courage in enduring his master’s
beatings. 129 Modern scholars, such as Myles McDonnell, tend to
argue that this instance is parody, and that a slave with virtus
would have been a humorous concept to the Roman audiences of
Plautus. 130 However, the Romans themselves would have also seen
the slave in question as exemplary, a slave who accepted his place
under his master was preferred to one who rebelled or disdained
his job. 131 In that context, virtus could be used to define an
exemplary, or “excellent,” slave, and so maintain the general
meaning of “excellence.”
Another example of a somewhat odd usage of virtus comes
from a later source: Cicero. While Plautus sometimes gave women
the descriptor of virtus, Cicero is better known for describing his
own wife’s virtus. 132 Myles McDonnell mentions this instance as
well, but simply glosses over it as a late Republican conception of
129

C. Stace, “The Slaves of Plautus,” Greece and Rome 15, No. 1 (1968): 68.
McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 24.
131
Roberta Stewart, Plautus and Roman Slavery (London: Blackwell Publishing,
2012), 26.
132
McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 169.
130

86

the word. Plautus’ use of virtus to describe clever women, as well
as Cicero’s wife’s virtus of excellence and competence as a wife
and mother, show a continuity of the usage of the word from the
middle Republic to the late Republic in that specific context.
Regardless of the linguistic origins of virtus being utilized
in this general way, it appears frequently enough that the general
meaning has to be a part of the overall definition of virtus. There
are so many examples of land having virtus, women having virtus,
slaves having virtus, and other non-Roman-male’s having virtus
that a less specific meaning of virtus had to have existed in the
Roman vernacular, and therefore in Roman writing.

III. Battlefield Virtus
Jeremiah McCall, a modern scholar with an emphasis on
the Roman aristocracy and military, claims that “virtus could only
be demonstrated on the battlefield.” 133 While the term “only”
certainly raises contention, the Romans did frequently use virtus
used as a battlefield term. McCall discusses the role of the
aristocratic cavalry in the army of the Republic and how each
member of a cavalry unit was expected to exhibit virtus. 134 This
specific virtus included the ideals of martial courage, single
combat, and other ideas based on one’s position on the battlefield
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and Roman social hierarchy.
For the rank and file soldiers, virtus meant courage. These
classical warriors may have believed courage was based on the
ideals of “single combat,” or dueling, as J.E. Lendon argues. 135
These virtues would have been inherited from the classical stories
in the Illiad and Odyssey, two Greek stories, along with older Latin
tales. The Romans frequently translated and told the story of
Othryades, the Spartan warrior who stayed on the battlefield even
after all of his comrades had perished, and claimed victory as the
two remaining Argive soldiers retreated to inform Argos of their
victory. 136 This story involved the champions of Sparta and Argos
in combat with one another, with the Spartan Othryades continuing
to fight and stay on the battlefield despite the loss of his unit and
his own sustained wounds. This act of bravery would have inspired
many Roman soldiers to emulate such acts in their own military
careers.
Nathan Rosenstein takes the Greek connection further,
arguing that, instead of emulating the Illiad, the Roman soldiers
saw virtus as a code similar to the Spartan’s own military
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tradition. 137 This code included the sacred duty “not to flee” battle
and to hold formation. 138 Rosenstein suggests the Romans would
have adopted this code from early experiences with the Greek citystates in southern Italy, and to an even larger extent from
emulation of Pyrrhus during the Pyrrhic War. 139 This explanation
of virtus would further explain why the story of Othryades was so
popular among the Romans. The Roman manipular formation,
however, leant itself far more to a mobile and flexible style of
combat, meaning the rigid formation code of the Spartans would
not have worked well when integrated into that battle formation.
Lendon extrapolates the single-combat aspect of virtus in
soldiers to the formation the Romans adopted in the middle
Republic. 140 The traditional explanation for the Roman maniple is
that they abandoned the phalanx in favor of a looser, more flexible
formation in order to fight the Samnites and other peoples in Italy.
Lendon, however, argues that the ideal of virtus, his definition
focusing on single combat and competition, lent itself to a looser
formation in which individual soldiers could have their duels with
opposing soldiers. 141 This is an interesting argument, and one that
is not in conflict with the definition of Roman soldiers’ battlefield
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virtus. Each individual soldier sought their own glory in their
service to the Roman state, and the Roman maniple provided them
an excellent outlet to show off their military prowess to their
comrades, fostering competition and brotherhood as well. 142
The aristocratic elements of the Roman army viewed virtus
differently from their lower-class compatriots. Though singlecombat was also a major factor in their battlefield virtus, the
aristocracy did this specifically because they wished to acquire
spolia opima, or “noble spoils.” 143 These spoils would be stripped
off an enemy that they had slain, generally an aristocrat of the
opposing side. In addition to the spolia opima, pure exhibitions of
courage, such as putting oneself in more danger than the call of
duty would require, could be rewarded with military accolades. 144
Either of these, the spolia opima or a military award, would launch
an aristocrat’s political career forward, and enable them to begin
the long ascension in political offices known as the cursus
honorum. 145

IV. Virtus and the Aristocracy
A Roman aristocrat aspired to ascend to a political or
military position wherein they would be awarded imperium, or the
142
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right to command troops. These positions included the praetors,
consuls and dictators, though the dictatorship was never actively
sought by Republican aristocrats until the end of the Republic, as it
only served as an emergency position. 146 In numerous Latin
accounts from Livy, Cicero, Cato, and others, men who had
obtained imperium via the cursus honorum automatically had
virtus. Cicero specifically stated that a man with imperium had
“singular virtus.” 147 This commonality between accounts suggests
that virtus was not necessarily a moral trait achieved by great men,
but an omnipresent trait intrinsic in great men who obtained the
highest powers and honors in Roman society. The specifics of this
trait changed throughout Roman history on the basis of who the
top men in the Republic were and how they achieved their
victories on and off the battlefield.
Aristocratic males were born under their pater familias, the
head of the family who was usually the oldest male, and were
actually owned by him until either his death or their entrance into
Roman public life. The aristocratic pater familias was generally a
successful patrician, and often a senator who had done his military
service and at least part of the cursus honorum to earn himself a
seat in the Senate upon his retirement. A pater familias’s primary
duty to their male children was to provide them education and an
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entrance into public life; this training would have included military
exercises and moral behavior lessons. The indoctrination of Roman
patriotism and virtus began at a very young age. 148
Once in the military, an aristocrat would either join the
cavalry (if his family had a certain amount of wealth) or become
captain for one of the infantry maniples. Once on the battlefield,
the aristocrat could search for his single combat or great act of
bravery to get himself noticed by their commanders and the
Senate. Once the battlefield virtus had been established by
achieving one of these two goals (or simply through longevity of
decent military service), public office was assured for that
aristocrat.
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Often, high-status (born into more noteworthy

families) aristocrats would skip a few of the early offices and go
straight to quaestor, tribune or a local magistrate, offices not far
away from major roles that held imperium.
When off the battlefield, an aristocrat could still display
virtus. This more philosophical ideal of virtus included loyalty to
the Roman state and “general excellence” as described previously.
Competency in their role in public office, an accumulation of
wealth, or even just a prestigious family name could contribute to
the Senate’s consideration of an aristocrat’s virtus. Examples from
later Roman literature display these trends; such as Cicero’s claims
that Cato had virtus more for his public and administrative deeds
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than for his military successes.

150

Likewise, even later

commentators, such as Seneca, claimed that Cicero should be
commended for having superior virtus, though he had no military
successes to speak of. 151

V. Virtus and Imperium
Eventually the Roman aristocrat would achieve a
successful military career, a productive decade in public offices,
become a praetor, consul or dictator, and receive the Roman power
of imperium. Once imperium was achieved, the definition of virtus
in such a man with imperium changed immensely. In fact, the
meaning of virtus itself changed frequently depending on the man
with imperium and his degree of success. From roughly 390 BC to
the Punic Wars, the Romans preferred an offensive foreign policy
due to a national paranoia that took hold after the Gallic sack of
Rome in 390 BC. 152
The case of the Dictator Fabius Maximus perhaps best
exemplifies this view of virtus. During the Second Punic War,
Hannibal of Carthage invaded the Italian peninsula and managed to
penetrate deep into the Roman lands of Latium, Campania,
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Samnium, and other southern Italian regions. 153 The Romans sent
out their consuls and praetors, the first line of Republican military
defenses, and their armies in an attempt to stop Hannibal from
burning the Italian countryside. These consuls and praetors acted
with the standard meaning of virtus during the time: aggressive
attacking strategies, despite tactical disadvantages and numerical
inferiority. 154 Their rash actions, done in an attempt to prove their
virtus, led to the disastrous battle at Lake Trasimene in 217 BC. 155
Lake Trasimene represented one of the most catastrophic
defeats in Roman history up to that point. The Roman Consul
Flaminius went up against Hannibal’s forces with a small consular
army when Hannibal invaded Etruria in 217. Hannibal knew that
the Roman generals were culturally expected to act aggressively,
and so he moved his army around the fortified Roman position and
instigated a fight south of Flaminius’ favored ground. 156 Flaminius,
attempting to avoid looking like a coward, advanced quickly to
meet Hannibal’s numerically superior forces, at an area around
Lake

Trasimene.

As

Flaminius

advanced,

“No

sort

of

reconnaissance” was performed, according to Livy, which was an
unnecessarily risky maneuver. 157 Flaminius was overconfident in
his presumed victory, and a poorly calculated attack (if successful)
153
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would not only greatly boost his political career and reputation, but
would also display his virtus as well.
Unfortunately, Hannibal expected the Roman consul to act
in an overly aggressive and rash manner. His army had hidden in
wait on the hillside, and when the Romans marched past, he
signaled his troops to attack. Livy describes the outcome best:
“Down they came from the hills, each many by the nearest way,
taking the Romans totally unprepared.” 158 This battle resulted in
the entirety of the consular army being enslaved, killed, or
otherwise disbanded, as well as the death of consul Flaminius
himself. 159
In response to this catastrophic loss, the Roman Senate
elected Fabius Maximus as Dictator. With a dictator in charge, all
other positions that normally held imperium, such as the praetors
and consuls, had to give their armies over to the dictator, who had
supreme military control. Fabius had previously held the
consulship three times, and had military prestige from his victories
over the Ligurians in the 230s. 160 The situation that Fabius
presided over was very bleak. Roman morale was low due to
repeated defeats and Carthaginian ravaging of the countryside, and
his armies were incredibly fearful of engagement with the ever-
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victorious Hannibal. 161
In order to raise his soldiers’ morale, Fabius chose a new
strategy in waging the war. Instead of following Hannibal and
attempting a direct confrontation, he chose merely to shadow
Hannibal and perform minor assaults on the Carthaginian baggage
train and light infantry. Polybius claims Fabius wished to “incur no
danger and not to risk a battle, but to make the safety of his men
his first and greatest object.” 162 For a few months, this strategy
worked quite well. The morale of both the army and the Senate
rose quickly while under Fabius’ leadership. 163
Unfortunately, while the Romans suffered no major defeats
with Fabius’ strategy, the Senate and Fabius’ subordinates did not
see any massive victories either. The Master of Horse, Fabius’
second in command named Minucius, believed that Fabius had
become too timid, and so he began leading small bands of troops
into direct conflict with Hannibal’s army. Minucius, according to
Livy, established the meaning of virtus as it pertained to him and
the Senate: “Rome’s power grew by action and daring – not by
these do-nothing tactics, which the faint-hearted call caution.” 164
In conjunction with Minucius’ denouncement of Fabius, the
Senate and army showed their displeasure as well. While the
161
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Senate merely berated Fabius, his army was highly mutinous and
did not follow Fabius’ orders. 165 In fact, it seemed that “Had the
matter been put to a general vote, there is little doubt that the army
would have declared a preference to serve under Minucius rather
than Fabius.” 166 Fabius was seen as cowardly precisely because he
was attempting to protect his army from destruction, rather than
aggressively pursuing the enemy as previous generations had done
to grow “Rome’s power.” 167
As a result, when Fabius’ term as dictator ended, he was
not asked to return in any form to an office with imperium, and he
retired in relative disgrace compared to how most at least partiallysuccessful generals did. 168 Immediately after, two new consuls
were assigned to lead the Roman armies in a more aggressive
strike at Hannibal. The Battle of Cannae occurred, resulting in the
total annihilation of the Roman military yet again. 169 The Senate
received their wish of two imperium-wielding generals that
exhibited the aggressive aspects of virtus, and their reward was
another catastrophic loss.
VI. A Fluid Virtus
The Roman army had been defeated handily at Lake
Trasimene and Cannae. Further defeats, caused by the aggressive
165
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and rash decisions of Roman generals wishing to prove their virtus,
were still to come. Eventually, though, the Senate learned its
lesson. Fabius Maximus was brought out of retirement, and
entrusted with the task of keeping Rome’s morale high, as well as
orchestrating any necessary defense of the city.
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For the

remainder of the conflict with Hannibal, a more cautious strategy
was allowed, and even the Roman soldiers accepted such
leadership without mutiny. Fabius himself gained “the reputation
of an

outstanding commander”

and

contemporaries as well as future Romans.

was

loved

by his

171

This shift represented a large change in Roman military
culture. Up to the time of Fabius, preemptive strike and an
aggressive military stance had been the normal mode of virtus for
Roman generals.
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Modern scholars, such as Lendon and

McDonnell, contend that the aggressive virtus continued full-force
past this point, all the way up to Augustus and the tragedy with
Varus and his legions along the Rhine.

173

The Senate and

aristocratic conceptions of virtus, however, seem to have been
more pragmatic than that.
Not only was the Senate willing to allow a massive shift in
military policy after the relative success of Fabius’ strategy, future
170
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strategic decisions of its like were also allowed. 174 The Senate
praised future generals, not only for their aggressiveness if they
had that trait, but also for their shrewd cunning in achieving
victory. Frontinus remarks that the Senate “turned back to Fabius
and his strategy” numerous times after the Punic Wars. 175
By the time of the early Principate, there was certainly
admiration for generals who used more strategic means to achieve
victory. Livy claims that Fabius used “wise delaying tactics” and
further criticized the Senate and soldiers under Fabius for having
ever held “contempt” for their commander. 176 Suetonius, a Roman
biographer of the middle Principate, credited Augustus with
saying, “a cautious general is better than a bold one.” 177 While
Suetonius’ comment would not necessarily represent what was
thought during the early Principate/Late Republic, it at least shows
that by the time of the second century A.D. there was a significant
cultural shift in seeing virtus more as a path to victory, regardless
of exactly which path is taken, rather than a specific virtue.
The alternative view of many scholars focused on the
rigidly aggressive and martial courage definitions of virtus, such as
McDonnell, is that, by the time of the Principate, virtus had lost
most of its original meaning due to Greek influences and
174

Goldsworthy, The Fall of Carthage, 196.
Frontinus, Stratagems, 8.14.1, 140.
176
Livy, The War With Hannibal, Book XXII, section 22, 120.
177
Suetonius, The Twelve Caesars, in Campbell, Brian, edit., Greek and Roman
Military Writers (New York: Routledge, 2004), 25.4, 80.
175

99

Augustus’ redefinitions of certain Roman cultural terms in order to
benefit himself. 178 This argument, however valid in explaining the
imperial definitions of virtus, does not explain the Senate’s
willingness to allow and actively promote the use of nonaggressive tactics and strategies in the wake of the Second Punic
War.

VII. Conclusion
Myles McDonnell finishes his book, Roman Manliness:
Virtus and the Roman Republic, with a short section on virtus in
the Principate. In this section, he claims that the Romans of this
period “could use both the martial and ethical meanings of virtus
frequently and naturally.” 179 By this time, virtus was a descriptor
given to those who achieved success in any major part of Roman
society, whether economic, political, military, or even religious.180
McDonnell argues that this change happened swiftly, with
Augustus having instituted most of the changes to the word virtus
and its public perception between the end of the Republic and the
first century AD. 181 McDonnell also argues, earlier in the book,
that men such as Cicero (from the late Republic) believed that
virtus was the main quality “responsible for Roman greatness,” and
that this quality had aspects in the military, political, and economic
178
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sections of Roman society. 182
By the very nature of McDonnell’s argument and Cicero’s
belief that virtus was how the Romans expanded their control over
the Mediterranean, virtus had no single, static meaning. The
Romans had not extended their territorial empire across the
Mediterranean world simply through aggression and martial
courage, but with a myriad of resources including diplomacy,
wealth, and adept leadership. In fact, from the view of Cicero,
virtus may as well have been defined simply as “Roman
greatness.” 183
Modern scholars’ attempts to define virtus as a strictly
military word, and, worse, as a strictly military word with only a
single military definition, come from a modern wish to translate
words into easy, exact definitions. In order to translate virtus,
however, the context the word is used in ends up far more
important than the word itself. Roman generals had virtus in the
early Republic due to their aggressive tactics that their enemies
simply could not handle. During the latter years of the Second
Punic War, Fabius had virtus due to his successful policy of
cautious, periodic combat. Cato’s land had virtus, because a good
harvest could come from its dirt. Plautus’ slaves had virtus,
because they embodied the ideal Roman slave.
Virtus defined those who attained victory and success. It
182
183

McDonnell, Roman Manliness, 2.
Ibid., 2.

101

was not that one man had distinct “martial courage,” and hence had
virtus, because those who exhibited such a virtue and died had no
virtus, such as those consuls who recklessly lost their own lives
and those of their men at Lake Trasimene and Cannae. There was a
definition of virtus that was popular among the lower classes, as
exemplified by Fabius’ mutinous soldiers who wanted only an
aggressive general such as Minucius, but this definition was just as
fluid as the more generalized usage used at the higher levels of
Roman society. The ideas of the aristocracy seem to have trickled
down to the lower classes, as mutinies became less common over
the years and there seems to have been a general acceptance that
the general’s orders were to be followed regardless of moral issues
surrounding aggression and virtus. 184
McDonnell’s argument about the homogenization of the
term virtus during the Principate is certainly valid. The
homogenized use of virtus, however, had existed for much longer
than that. And before the homogenization of usage of the word,
which can be dated to the late Republican writers, the term itself
was fluid with its meaning. From defining the fertility of land to
the excellence of slaves to the martial courage of soldiers, virtus
was the primary word the Romans used to describe anything they
found to be successful or generally positive. If sources existed in a
more vernacular version of Latin, it is likely that virtus may have
184
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even shown up as a more or less synonym of the modern English
word “successful.” Unfortunately, without such a source to
analyze, the numerous shifting usages of virtus in the Latin lexicon
leave the scholar with only one real conclusion: virtus represented
“Roman excellence,” and had no single translation at any one time
in Roman history.
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The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara:
The Economic and Political Persecutions
and the Tradition of Peasant Revolt
By
Jake Farias
~

~

The Shimabara Rebellion from 1637 to 1638 remains one
of the most historically divisive events in Japanese early modern
history.

The Rebellion threw the Shimabara and Amakusa

provinces on the far south of Japanese islands into outright revolt
against their lords, and, later, against the army of the shogunate
itself.

The cause of the Rebellion remains a popular

historiographical debate into the modern day. Some contend that
the sizeable, if still minority, population of Japanese Christians in
these distant provinces revolted in order to overthrow a
government whose public policy included the persecution, torture,
and execution of Christians.

Others argue that economic

oppression forced the peasants into revolt against irresponsible
daimyo, or local lords, with the Christian element being
overplayed in historical records. Neither of these interpretations
fully captures the nature of the Shimabara Rebellion. Tokugawa
Japan, even after the Rebellion, maintained a long tradition of
peasant resistance to the domination by the daimyo through
109

petitions, inactivity, and even outright violence.

Economic

hardship and political persecution undoubtedly pressured peasants
into rebellion against their lords in Shimabara and Amakusa.
However, Christian influences in these regions tied together the
revolt of farmers, unemployed soldiers, and other classes. The
Shimabara Rebellion was not a peasants’ revolt against unjust
taxation or a Christian uprising.

The Rebellion was the last

measure of a desperate people, pushed together by a common
economic suffering and held together by a common culture
marked, but not consumed, by Japanese Christianity. After the
Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate’s persecution of Christianity
was a concentrated effort to cut or replace these cultural and
religious ties in order to end the threat of any future powerful and
unified revolts.

The shogunate’s reaction reveals how they

recognized the multiple causes of the Rebellion and used the
experience to prevent future insurrections.
In order to properly understand how the Shimabara arose,
historians must be aware not just of the economic and religious
environment, but also of the common practices of the peasant
class.

Although the Tokugawa era was characterized by

administrative and government domination, the chonin, or middle
to lower classes, still maintained some ability to resist unilateral
domination by their daimyo.

Peasants eventually submitted to

social immobility and high taxes from their lords; however, they
were still able to influence local policy. Often, in instances of bad
110

farming or famine, peasants requested exemption or lowering of
the tax rate. 185 While the daimyo had no legal obligation to act on
these peasant demands, their acceptance hinted at a local
relationship more flexible than the national tax-collecting policy.
Despite the heavy cost demands of the upkeep of estate, personal
castle, and lavish lifestyle, daimyo were more willing to negotiate
with peasants than to risk a costly revolt. Often these appeals were
conducted through village headmen and the wealthy farming
families who sought to retain a greater amount of surplus crop. 186
However, increased tax burdens most heavily affected the poorer
farming families, who could be driven to starvation in years of bad
harvest. As a result, some of these poor farmers threatened to
abandon their land, leaving the domain’s agricultural base without
its primary labor force.

In the pursuit for concessions, the

headsman used typical honorifics and appeals to their “benevolent
lordship,” laced with dissatisfaction over the lord’s administration.
In extreme cases, peasant classes chanced open revolt when their
daimyo ignored petitions and refused any concessions.

Only

twenty years after the bloody Shimabara Rebellion, peasants under
the Kurume administration in southern Japan violently revolted
when their lord refused to lower “unheard of taxes” and every
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demand by the peasants. 187
As a result, typically the daimyo and the shogunate opted to
appease the peasant population instead of having to crush outright
rebellion. 188 Daimyo that lost control over their peasant population
were often replaced and dishonored by their administrative failure.
Through this policy of mutual responsibility, the chief concerns of
the daimyo shifted from collecting as much as possible from the
peasant population to maintaining peace and order in their domain.
Although the exploitation of peasants through poll taxes,
agricultural taxes, and more continued, daimyo made concessions
and tax breaks to avoid the humiliation of a revolt. The complicity
of the law was better assured when the peasants respected their
lord and believed they would receive fair treatment. For example,
even after the brutally repressed Shimabara Rebellion, peasants hid
their rice from tax collectors in Bizan. 189 Efficient tax collection
was easier and better guaranteed through appeasement, not force.
Tokugawa era daimyo exploited the peasantry, but the peasantry
retained an agency to defy absolute domination.
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Many historians have discussed the Shimabara Rebellion in
detail, primarily focusing on the causes of the revolt.

Older

research tended to place the blame on the harsh anti-Christian
policies enacted by the daimyo. Neil Fujita and Joseph Sebes both
attributed the rebellion as an outburst of persecuted Japanese
Christians, joined by hidden Christians who had been “forced to
apostatize” through torture and intimidation.

190

Japanese

Christians were a significant minority in southern Japan.
Originally, daimyo had forced their peasantry to convert to
Christianity in order to attract European ships and the goods they
carried, particularly guns.

Although the demand for guns

significantly lessened once the Tokugawa shogunate stiffened its
control over the nation, many of the peasants remained committed
to their newfound religion.

Reports of the Rebellion, from

European and Japanese sources, detailed the rebels’ use of
Christian symbols and banners. However, Fujita and Sebes’ theory
relied on a much larger population of Japanese Christians than
actually existed in Kyushu. More realistically, modern historians
relied on the tradition and accounts of peasant rebellions to explain
the Rebellion. 191 Using research by historians such as Donald
Burton and Geoffrey Parker, more recent narratives explained the
190
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Shimabara Rebellion as a peasants’ revolt against political injustice
and unbearable taxation. Geoffrey Gunn explicitly described this
version of events as “refreshingly modern.” 192 However, to simply
disregard the well-documented Christian element of the Rebellion
does not fully explore the origins of the Shimabara Rebellion, nor
explain the harsh reprisals against Christianity following the
Rebellion. 193 Recently, more historians have rejected both the
Christian uprising and peasant revolt narratives, entertaining the
idea that both elements substantially influenced the Rebellion.
Ohashi Yukihiro, a younger and newer historian, even explored
how the opposing narratives of the Shimabara Rebellion were
developed by historians after concluding that multiple elements of
social hierarchy and cohesion, religious persecution, and economic
despotism made the Rebellion possible.

Ultimately, historians

have increasingly accepted that there is no singular cause, and have
begun to explore how the memory of the Shimabara Rebellion was
created to simplify the historical narrative and foist the blame for
civil unrest on the small minority of Japanese Christians.
In Shimabara and Amakusa, economic pressures were so
dire as to require these methods of resistance. Many peasants
complained of heavy taxes and of difficulty living.
192
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farmers could not retain as much surplus and poor farmers risked
starvation under the new Shimabara lord. 194 The previous lord,
who had also burdened the population with persecution of
Christianity and heavy taxes, had died suddenly, leaving his
inexperienced son to continue his unpopular policies. Peasants in
Amakusa suffered similarly and this heavy economic oppression
irked many of the farmers, both wealthy and poor. 195 Duarte
Correa, a Portuguese sea captain-turned-Jesuit, recorded that the
peasants of Amakusa were forced to pay the annual tribute in
wheat, rice, and barley as well as two additional imposts.
Furthermore, Correa asserted that the peasantry was expected to
serve the daimyo in every way possible, such as supplying
firewood to their lord’s soldiers. 196 While Correa’s testimony is
steeped in bias, as a secret Catholic missionary, these claims
leveled against the lords of Shimabara and Amakusa are supported
by their inexperience and youth. 197

Additionally, extravagant

spending by the daimyo was typically expected, from the expenses

194

Ohashi Yukihiro, trans. Martin Ramos, “The Revolt of ShimabaraAmakusa,” Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies, no. 20 (2010), 74.
Historical Abstracts.
195
Gunn, “Duarte Correa,” 7.
196
Ibid., 12.
197
Correa, as a Portuguese Jesuit, looked to avoid placing the blame of the
rebellion on Christianity itself. Rather, he blamed the faulty administration of
the daimyo in order to clear Christianity of most responsibility of the Rebellion.
Ultimately, his efforts fell short as the Tokugawa bakufu cited the Rebellion as a
major Christian uprising and banned Christianity from Japan. Correa was later
imprisoned for his Portuguese ethnicity and Christian faith in Nagasaki, tortured,
and burned to death.

115

of sankin kotai to the costs of maintain their castle, dress, and other
status symbols. 198 Being inexperienced daimyo, these two lords
may have been overwhelmed by their administrative and social
duties and resorted to raising taxes to procure the appropriate
funds. However, through the eyes of the peasants, these daimyo
openly exploited their peasant class in order to enhance their own
personal wealth. Most accounts claim that the Shimabara lord
used most of the collected taxes in order to fund the building of his
new Shimabara castle at the expense of the farming class.
Furthermore, the lords punctuated these economic injustices with
acts of political terror and torture. Peasants unable to supply taxes
were beaten, drowned, and killed on the administration’s orders.199
These economic and political abuses created a highly volatile
sentiment among the commoner classes, especially the farmers.
These economic and political injustices were compounded
by the religious persecution enacted by both the state and local
governments. Since Toyotomi Hideoyoshi’s reign, the government
had, at least on paper, opposed the expansion and continued
presence of Christianity in Japan. In 1587, Hideyoshi declared that
any lord who wanted to become a “follower of the padres (priests)”
of their own volition could do so and also convert their fief, only
198
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prohibiting some of the wealthier and more influential fief owners
from doing so. 200 However, in the same year, Hideyoshi also
expelled the missionaries from Japan and denounced his vassals
who had convinced the peasants of their fief to convert as well.201
Christianity had first arrived in southern Japan in the mid 1500’s,
brought in force by Portuguese missionaries and later by Christian
Dutch and British merchant companies. As evidenced in Samurai
William, these Southern lords employed a number of methods to
attract European trading company ships. 202 Acting independently
of the daimyo, some lords converted to Christianity to attract the
European merchants to their cities, or at least provided Christian
missionaries with access to the countryside and peasant population.
Some peasants converted upon their lord’s conversion to
Christianity while others were convinced by the preaching of the
Christian priests. Japanese Christians never became a majority in
southern Japan, but did account for a sizeable minority of the
population.
Although Christianity was still, to some extent, prevalent in
200
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Kyushu in the early 1600’s under the first Tokugawa shogun,
Tokugawa Ieyasu, the succeeding shoguns harshly condemned the
foreign religion.

203

During the early Tokugawa shogunate,

Christianity experienced a “dramatic decline,” likely due to the
shogunate’s increasing alienation and restriction of European
influences during the Edo period. 204 Christianity was only truly
valued for the trade, specifically guns, it brought in from European
merchants; with the pacification of Japan under Tokugawa Ieyasu,
there was a decreased demand for guns and a significant decreased
value on trade with the European Christians. Christian faith was
considered a crime.

This policy was not entirely unique to

Christianity, as unpopular Buddhist sects and families of disloyal
retainers received similar treatment.

Regardless, hundreds of

Christians were executed in Kyoto in 1619 and in Nagasaki in
1622. 205 Records of Christians being imprisoned, decapitated, and
burned alive characterized the shogunate’s attitude towards
Japanese Christians. 206 Even more graphic executions included
crucifixion, water torture, mutilation, and “suspending the prisoner
head down over a pit of excrement.”

Many of the Japanese

Christians recanted to avoid punishment while others were driven
203
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into underground groups. 207 The Tokugawa bakufu’s desire for
control, stability, and order compelled it to attempt to quash
Christianity. 208 The Era of the Warring States, characterized by
near constant civil war across Japan by competing warlords, was
over and there was no longer any need for trade with the
Europeans.

To emphasize the point, two years before the

Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate issued an edict
barring the Catholic priests from Japan, demanding that its
citizenry report any found padres, and promised to put to death any
Japanese returning from overseas. 209 Christianity had outstayed its
welcome in Tokugawa Japan, as the bakufu sought to consolidate
its control over its population’s personal and religious lives. Zen
Buddhism was becoming a national religion used to encourage
loyalty and subservience among the peasantry and to reinforce
Tokugawa authority instead of opposing it. 210 In the eyes of the
shogunate, Christianity had outlived its usefulness and had become
a cause of disorder in the religious conflict it provoked.
At the local level, the Shimabara and Amakusa lords
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engaged in the persecution of Christians in the same manner as the
shogunate. This process was very common in domains formerly
controlled by Christian daimyo. 211 In a later letter to shogunate
forces, one rebel claimed that their only wish was to practice
Christianity without repression. 212 Although this demand was not
universal for the Shimabara rebels, a significant percentage of
Japanese Christians lived in constant fear of being arrested and
executed for their religion.

The Shimabara and Amakusa

repressions of Christianity worsened an already toxic relationship
between the daimyo and their peasants.
This common suffering of the Shimabara and Amakusa
peasants, both Christians and non-Christians, was pushed to a
breaking point by 1637 CE. The peasants of Shimabara revolted,
attacking the lord’s tax officials and men.

The peasants,

merchants, craftsmen, and unemployed soldiers of Amakusa
followed, as joined the rebellion out of choice or force. These
rebels converged on Hara Castle to reform and organize,
appointing the 16-year old Amakusa Shiro as their “leader.” 213
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success of the rebellion imply that more experienced warriors planned the
military aspect of the rebellion.
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Hara Castle was besieged by Tokugawa forces but their initial
attempts to crush the rebels failed. After almost four months, the
Tokugawa forces starved the rebels of food, resources, and
ammunition.

Hara Castle fell and the Tokugawa forces

exterminated almost all of the participating rebels.

After the

massacre, the shogunate issued edicts expelling and banning all
Europeans, except for the Dutch at Nagasaki, and reinforcing the
outlaw of Christianity in Japan. After the Rebellion, Christianity
was affixed with a permanent stigma of violence, disorder, and
disrespect for proper authority. The Tokugawa shogunate issued
propaganda portraying Christianity as impure and inappropriate
while also promising rewards to those who reported Christian
practitioners. 214 Japanese Christians were forced underground to
hide their religion and the Tokugawa shogunate eliminated
Japanese Christianity as what they perceived as a threat.
Although historians like Fujita or Gunn argue whether
economic or religious oppression was more significant in pushing
the Tokugawa peasantry to revolt, the Rebellion was much more
complicated. The communities of Shimabara and Amakusa were
tightly knit, tied together by a common culture. Christianity had
its largest base for support in southern Japan, and Japanese
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Christians made up a significant percentage of the population.
Although public acts of torture and execution were intended to
horrify and scare the populace into submission, at the time, local
daimyo could only safely employ it in moderation. By overusing
these methods, the daimyo pushed the population past the breaking
point, to where they were convinced that they were more safe
revolting than continuing under the daimyo’s rule.

Japanese

Christians and non-Christian peasants were tied together by the
communal need to survive. In times of famine or bad harvests, the
village headmen, regardless of their religion, campaigned for lower
tax rates, tax breaks, and exemptions.

Regardless of their

differences in religion, wealth, or social status, the peasantry pulled
together in times of extreme despotism with the intention of
forcing improvement in their standard of living. In their struggle
to survive, the agricultural base had created a community that
relied on each other to demand concessions from the state
authority.
Additionally,

although

only

Christians

were

being

persecuted for religious reasons, every member of the commoner
class was being exploited economically and oppressed politically.
In an effort to both help fund the reconstruction of Edo’s walls and
to build his own Shimabara Castle, Shigemasa Matsukura, the new
lord, imposed heavy taxes and developed strict penalties for the
farmers who failed to provide. Many of these taxes seem almost
ridiculous to modern thinking, such as taxes for the death of a
122

family member. Families unable to pay their taxes were starved,
beaten, tortured, or killed. The mothers and daughters of these
families were sold into brothels.
forthcoming.
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Concessions were not

The economic and political oppression unified the

peasantry into a culture of suffering, one in which mutual
dependence was essential.
Economic grievances played a significant role in the start
of the Rebellion. The unbearable taxes and system of punishments
pushed the peasantry to desperate measures.

As the lifestyle

became more and more untenable, the peasants turned to their own
and implemented the only option left available to resist: open
rebellion.

At its very least, revolt attracted the attention, and

displeasure, of the shogunate. In some ways, the peasant revolt
can be interpreted as a Pyrrhic victory, mutually assured
destruction for both the rebels and the daimyo. In previous cases,
daimyo were dishonored and removed from office as punishment
for failing to maintain peace in their domain.

Political and

economic despotism forced peasants to drastic actions. The close
bonds between the community, strengthened by a common culture
and common “suffering,” assured that the rebels organized,
mobilized, and, largely remained loyal to each other.
The Shimabara Rebellion was an incredibly costly
challenge to Tokugawa authority.
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The rebels raided armories,

killed Tokugawa soldiers, and forced a lengthy siege.

More

importantly, the Rebellion embarrassed the bakufu; although the
peasantry was incited against their daimyo, these commoners-inarms managed to occupy a castle, repulse, and kill trained
military. 216 In short, the Shimabara Rebellion was not a mistake
the shogunate could allow to happen again. To prevent another
uprising of the similar nature, the Tokugawa shogunate devoted
itself to the expulsion and elimination of Christianity in the
domains. By foisting the blame on the Japanese Christians, the
shogunate could divide the communities in southern Japan where
Christians were still a significant minority.
The Tokugawa shogunate employed a more developed and
systematic persecution of Christians. Propaganda was specifically
designed to demonize the European Christian missionaries. In one
chapbook, the Christian “padre” is described more like a goblin
than human, with the intention of taking over Japan. 217 These
depictions were intended to scare Japanese away from interaction
with Christianity and to create a connotation between Christianity
and evil. However, this propaganda piece also did much more.
The Buddhist monk ultimately prevents the spread of the priest’s
“screeching,” juxtaposing the wild and uncivilized image of the
216
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Christian padre with the calm wisdom and loyalty of the Buddhist
monk.

By denigrating Christianity, this excerpt elevates Zen

Buddhism which was quickly becoming the Tokugawa’s influence
on religion.

Kirishitan also legitimized the reprisals of the

shogunate against Christianity; in this text, the shogun has the
moral right to destroy their temples and punish those that remain
Christian. 218 The shogunate certainly exercised this right more
frequently and publicly after the rebellion. While the previous
executions had been sporadic and scattered, the shogunate
enforced stricter laws ordering the population to report Japanese
Christians.

One set of Household Laws from 1640 includes

numerous charges to investigate and report any Christian activities.
All villagers were also required to report to the “pertinent temple,”
as Zen Buddhist temples took over the responsibility of ensuring
the Tokugawa shogunate’s control over its citizens’ religions.
Tokugawa officials assumed these laws would be followed,
because if Christians were discovered by these officials, the entire
village would be punished. 219 One edict ordered by the Tokugawa
senior counselors in 1639 captures the spirit of this policy:
With regard to those who believe in
Christianity, you are aware that there
is a proscription, and thus knowing,
you are not permitted to allow padres
218
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and those who believe in their
teachings to come aboard your ships.
If there is any violation, all of you
who are aboard will be considered
culpable. If there is anyone who
hides the fact that he is a Christian
and boards your ship, you may report
it to us. A substantial reward will be
given to you for this information. 220
This memorandum was addressed to Chinese and Dutch ships.
The bakufu clarified that foreigners could be Christian as long as
they did not propagate. However, this edict demonstrates the
bakufu’s main tool in rooting out Christianity was not officials or
even Buddhist temples but the civilian population itself. The threat
of punishment for failing to report Christians compelled the nonChristian population to take an active role in searching out
Christians within their own village or town.

The promise of

reward made compliance even more appealing.
The concept that everyone would suffer for the religious
beliefs on one individual drove a wedge between Japanese
Christians and non-Christians.

These Group Laws, and the

promised reprisals for disobeying them, severed the cultural ties
and communal spirit that had united the Shimabara and Amakusa
peasants regardless of religion. With these laws, commoners had
to fear their neighbor, not support them. Edicts like these helped
220
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the Tokugawa government root out Christianity−and prevent the
disorder it could create−but also cut any ties of trust or fellowship
that could unite peasant families in a revolt.
However, the Tokugawa shogunate also understood the role
corrupt and incompetent daimyo played in inciting the Shimabara
Rebellion. Both Matsukura and Katataka were instructed to end
their lives in penance for failing to keep the peace. Future daimyo
were more incentivized to treat their peasants well, rather than risk
the humiliation of a revolt.

221

In this way, the shogunate

discouraged corruption and injustice, based on its risks of agitating
the populace and creating the necessary dissatisfaction for a revolt.
Although Group Laws kept villages divided and fearful of one
another, too much economic and political despotism would still
drive the peasantry together. As one abbot Kodo told the lord of
Kurume, cornered rats will even “bite the cat when driven to
extremity.” 222 Kodo’s statement, whether an invention of memory
or true, shows that the Tokugawa understand why peasants revolt
and seek to crush the causes for their discontent in addition to their
means to stage rebellions.

Corrupt and incompetent daimyo

threatened the stability of Tokugawa Japan as much as
Christianity. In order to avoid revolt and the resultant humiliation,
daimyo were pressured to practice fair taxation and law.
Later daimyo would employ a number of methods for
221
222
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quelling peasant dissent. Some lords made concessions in order to
appease the peasantry.

Dete Masamune in Sendai cleverly

managed to both gain the peasantry’s support for his rule by
reducing the tax rate while also gaining more control over the
surplus agricultural production and maximum revenue by
broadening the tax base. 223 In Dete’s case, he avoided pushing the
peasant population to desperation and his concessions in the tax
rate kept the populace peaceful. Simultaneously, he also increased
his control and revenue from the agricultural farmland.

Other

lords employed speakers like Hosoi Heishu to pacify their peasant
populations. In 1783, Hosoi was hired by the daimyo of Owari to
mollify the peasantry, angered by poor living conditions worsened
by a bout of famine. 224 Hosoi’s allegorical sermon on the filial
promise of a young wife to her parents-in-law was intended to
remind the peasantry of their own duties to their lords and prevent
any plots of dissent or rebellion against the Owari daimyo. 225 The
sermon was widely popular and drew huge crowds.

In this

manner, the daimyo were able to broadcast their messages of
loyalty and moral behavior to a wide peasant population. Dete’s
manipulation of the tax base and Hosoi’s sermons illustrate how
223
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daimyo after the Shimabara Rebellion worked to pacify their
peasant populations while also gaining more control over them.
The Tokugawa shogunate strived for control over its
population. Especially in early years, with the tumultuous Warring
States years still fresh in the national memory, the shogunate
believed political domination and unflinching order as the only
path to peace. Arguably, the violent methods they employed to
subdue the peasantry and their daimyo prevented the outbreak of
an even more destructive and violent war between states. Driving
a wedge between the Christians and the rest of Japan, they took
away the ability for Christianity to become a rallying cry for
peasant revolt. Communities would remain divided by “fear of thy
neighbor,” and could not organize easily or harmoniously.
Furthermore, the rise of the Zen Buddhist temples as the religious
arm of the Tokugawa gave them tighter control over the personal
spiritual lives of its subjects. 226 Soto Zen temples monitored
parishioners in order to prohibit other religions independent of
Tokugawa control, especially Christianity and the Nichiren Fuju
Fuse. 227 These temples, much like the constant codes of conduct,
would advocate for appropriate behavior, knowing one’s place in
the social hierarchy, and submission to the daimyo and shogunate.
By demonstrating the penalty for failure, daimyo were pressured to
226
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minimize corruption and punishment in their domain, or to at least
formulate methods for placating or subduing the local population.
Bearable taxation and living conditions deterred many peasants
from resorting to open rebellion. The Tokugawa goal was to take
away both the cause and means of peasant rebellion, in order to
maintain peace in the realm.
Ohashi explored how memory and historical analysis
influenced the evolving narrative of the Shimabara Rebellion. In
early-modern Japan, Christian heresy and disruptive European
influences were emphasized and the despotism of the Shimabara
and Amakusa lords was placed in the background. 228

This

narrative justified, at least in their own eyes, Tokugawa
shogunate’s harsh persecution of Japanese Christians and their
expulsion of the Europeans. As a result, the Christian uprising
narrative dominated the early Japanese historical accounts and,
subsequently, the early European historians who used their work.
However, in later research, more historians recognized how the
Rebellion also demonstrated a struggle between peasants and lords,
on the grounds of political terrorism and economic oppression.
Ohashi contended that later historians focused more on social and
economic histories, though perhaps too narrowly. 229 Though they
had uncovered another driving cause for the Rebellion, they only
reordered the causes to place unbearable taxation and punishment
228
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as the primary cause and Christianity as a secondary. In order to
accurately understand the Shimabara Rebellion, Ohashi asserted
historians must stop resorting to an “either-or” binary debate. 230
Instead of contesting which cause had more influence, historians
should attempt to uncover the relationships between Christian
persecution and economic oppression and how they compounded
to explode into the Rebellion.
The Shimabara Rebellion occurred within a tradition of
socially cohesive groups of peasants resisting domination by their
lord. Influenced by resentment over religious persecution, outrage
over harsh punishments from the daimyo, and unbearable taxation,
the Rebellion was a desperate act by a peasantry left with few other
options to survive. Due to the strong communal ties between the
Kyushu peasantry, which included a substantial Japanese Christian
population, the Rebellion survived for four months and drove the
lords of Shimabara and Amakusa to humiliation and seppuku. The
Tokugawa shogunate’s response shows how these influences were
all vital to the Rebellion’s success, by trying to remove all these
factors, including Christianity, the local cultural alliances, and the
provocative corruption of incompetent daimyo. Instead of trying
to simplify the Shimabara Rebellion into a single-storied narrative,
historians must allow the Rebellion to exist as a complicated
historical event.

230
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"Under the Auspices of Peace":
The Northwest Indian War and its Impact on
the Early American Republic
By
Melanie L. Fernandes
~

~

In April, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the
first president of the United States of America. Filled with pride
for his new country and hope for its future, he spoke in his
inaugural address about the prospects of the United States.
Washington was clear that above all, the new government of the
United States should do right by itself to preserve the nation and
protect its citizens:
In these honorable qualifications, I
behold the surest pledges, that as on
one side, no local prejudices, or
attachments; no seperate [sic] views,
nor party animosities, will misdirect
the comprehensive and equal eye
which ought to watch over this great
assemblage of communities and
interests: so, on another, that the
foundations of our National policy
will be laid in the pure and
immutable principles of private
morality; and the pre-eminence of a
135

free Government, be exemplified by
all the attributes which can win the
affections of its Citizens, and
command the respect of the world. 231
Washington wanted for no particular group's interests to dictate the
government's policies, and he wanted to ensure that the
government would always have the nation and its citizens' best
interests in mind. For Washington, this was one means of working
towards his main goal for the nation: that the United States as a
new nation would "command the respect of the world."
In order to achieve this, Washington had numerous
ambitious, but necessary, goals for the nation.

He wanted to

reduce the national debt, establish a strong currency, and reopen
trade and renew amiable relations with the British. In short, his
goals all had to do with economic and national security, which he
understood to be crucial to the protection and success of the nation.
Washington and his contemporaries knew that proving the
legitimacy of the United States to major European powers was
extremely important during the early years of the republic, as this
was when it was most vulnerable. Unfortunately for these men, the
process of establishing the foundation of the United States was far
more complicated than they would have hoped. Along with all the
pressures of establishing order and an effective government,
231
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managing the national debt from the Revolutionary War, and
attempting to reconcile with Great Britain, the United States faced
conflict with Indian tribes that threatened the entire success of the
nation.
It is undeniable that the nation’s early success was largely
tied to Indian relations. In some sense this was because
Washington and other national leaders saw the nation’s success as
contingent upon the opening of the Northwest Territory. The
Treaty of Paris, which signified the official end of the American
Revolution in 1783, extended the western border of the United
States to the Mississippi River. The Continental Congress, the
governing body from the Revolution until the establishment of the
new federal government in 1789, planned to decrease national debt
by selling this land to settlers on the western frontier.
However, the Native Americans living in this territory were
not consulted when the Treaty of Paris was signed. Tension and
animosity exploded as the United States attempted to assert their
dominance on the lands that Native Americans still claimed. These
tensions had years to build up between the end of the
Revolutionary War and when Washington took office in 1789.
However, until Washington's presidency the Continental Congress
did not take Native American opinion into consideration when
forming Indian policy. Continued violence marked the relationship
between the frontier settlers and several western Native American
tribes. As a result, Washington accepted his presidency just as
137

conflicts were reaching a climax. Frontiersmen demanded federal
protection from the Indians; Indians refused to cede their lands,
demanding that the borderline of the United States be moved back
to its previous point at the Ohio River. Yet, with no regular army,
minimal federal funds, and a government in its infancy,
Washington was hardly in an optimal position to deal with this
conflict. It was crucial that he deal with this issue effectively, as
this was one of the first tests of the new nation's governing ability.
Washington was torn. While he wanted to come to a
peaceful settlement with the dominant Northwestern Indian tribes,
the Indians were not willing to make peace with the new
Mississippi River land boundary and the United States was not
willing to give up the Northwest Territory. Settlers were eager to
move into the area, and Congress linked the progress of the nation
to the acquisition of this territory. It seemed that Washington had
no choice but to assert American authority and use force against
the Indians. After all, simply conceding to them would make the
United States federal government appear weak to Great Britain, the
Indian tribes, and to the citizens of the United States. The federal
government decided it would be in the United States' best interest
to launch a military expedition to punish the aggressive Indian
tribes.
The military campaigns sent by the United States to quell
Indian hostilities in the Ohio country between 1790-1795 are
collectively known as the Northwest Indian War. Historians have
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noted this conflict as significant, and even critical, both in the
course of Washington's presidency and the early development of
the nation. However, there was no shortage of adversities for
Washington to overcome as the first president of the United States,
and the Northwest Indian War is often depicted as another issue on
the list. Typically, this scholarship explores the Northwest Indian
War in the context of overall Indian relations in the United States
between

1785-1815.

232

Even

Wiley

Sword's

President

Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 spends relatively little time exploring the deeper
implications that these events had on the development of the
United States. 233 More recently, Colin Calloway and William
Patrick Walsh have focused on the nation's response to this
conflict, but neither considers its impact in defining federal powers
over the West and the states. 234 An examination of the papers of
George Washington and his contemporaries indicates how they
used the Northwest Indian War as an opportunity to strengthen the
federal government. Native American relations and policy during
232
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this period were instrumental in defining the roles and abilities of
the federal government. In many ways, the Northwest Indian War
gave the United States the opportunity to establish how the federal
government would be viewed not just by its own citizens, but by
dominant powers of the world.

Securing Indian Lands
A great deal of conflict occurred between the end of the
Revolutionary War in 1783 and the establishment of the new
federal

government

in

1789.

This

conflict

defined

the

circumstances leading ultimately to the Northwest Indian War.
During these years the United States operated under the governing
body of the Continental Congress, which was established in 1774.
At this time Congress set the precedent for what the United States'
Native American policy would be, and the events of this period
directly affected the circumstances that surrounded Washington
when he entered the presidency.
At the conclusion of the American Revolution, the United
States and Britain both signed the Treaty of Paris to officially
establish peace between them. As a concession of this treaty,
Britain ceded the land known as the Northwest Territory to the
United States; the United States' western boarder was extended to
the Mississippi River, which Britain permitted the United States to
utilize for trade. The treaty also required Britain to remove all its
soldiers from any western
140

Figure 1

Old Northwest Region, 1783-90 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1985), 2.

forts they occupied, but the British continued to hold the forts of
Michilimackinac, Detroit, Niagra, Oswego, Oswegatchie, and
several others for more than a decade after the treaty was signed. 235
This allowed them to protect their extensive western trade and
thereby maintain influence with their Native American allies,
especially as the United States pushed into western territory. 236
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The British presence in the Northwest Territory would be
problematic for the United States in the years to come.
After the Treaty of Paris, treaty commissioners from the
United States told the Indians living in the Northwest Territory that
they were a conquered people, and as such were not entitled to live
in the Northwest Territory. The Indians felt betrayed and
abandoned by the British, who had not consulted them about the
Treaty of Paris land cessions and left them to reconcile with the
Americans on their own. The American federal government
proceeded to develop their Indian policy around the assumption
that the United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest
Territory. 237 The implementation of this policy resulted in the
Treaty of Fort Stanwix, Treaty of McIntosh, and the Treaty of Fort
Finney. The United States used these three treaties to secure land
from the Indians in the Northwest Territory. With each of these
treaties, the United States commissioners indicated that they
wanted to make peace with the Native Americans. However, when
the Native American tribes arrived at the treaty meetings they
found that the commissioners had little intention of actually
negotiating with them.
In 1784, the United States made the Treaty of Fort Stanwix
with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. The Iroquois arrived at Fort
Stanwix in New York in October ready to discuss terms of peace.
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Instead, the congressional commissioners read them the terms of
the Treaty of Paris and they asked the Indians to choose a
boundary line between United States and Indian land. 238 As some
of the Iroquois tribes had been allied with the British during the
Revolutionary War, the commissioners felt justified in dominating
the treaty-making process. Cornplanter, a leader of the Seneca
nation, acted as a spokesman and proposed to uphold the Ohio
River boundary that had been established in a former treaty, the
1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. Cornplanter explained that the
traditional role of the Six Nations was to speak on behalf of the
other western tribes and such a boundary would be in the best
interest of all the western Indian tribes. 239 However, this boundary
would have cut the United States off from much of the Northwest
Territory. The commissioners told the Iroquois that they had no
right to propose such a conservative boundary, as the United States
was now the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory. They
then offered the Iroquois an ultimatum: give up their land claims in
the Northwest Territory, or face war with the United States. 240
The 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix ultimately caused a divide
in the Iroquois nations. With each nation on different standing with
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the United States it was difficult for the Six Nations to remain
firmly unified and their confederacy began to deteriorate. Thus, the
dominance of the Iroquois declined among the western Indians. As
Cornplanter indicated in the treaty deliberations, the Iroquois had
traditionally been a dominant force in the intertribal dynamic of the
Northwest Territory. This gave way for the Shawnee and Miami,
two tribes affected by a later treaty, to become more dominant
powers in the west. 241
The Americans enacted a second peace treaty, known as the
Treaty of Fort McIntosh, with the Delaware and Wyandot tribes.
The signing of this treaty took place thirty miles northwest of
Pittsburgh in January, 1785. As with the Treaty of Fort Stanwix,
the commissioners threatened war if these Indian tribes did not
give up their lands and agree to live on designated United States
reservations in the northern part of Ohio. 242 The last of these three
treaties was made with the Shawnee, Miami, Potawatomi, and
various Wabash tribes. Known as the Treaty of Fort Finney, or the
Treaty at the Mouth of the Great Miami, it took place at the
convergence of the Miami and Ohio Rivers in January, 1786. It
restricted the Shawnee to a reservation next to the designated
Delaware and Wyandot reservations in the northern corner of Ohio
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and Indiana. 243 Aware of the results of the Treaties of Fort Stanwix
and Fort McIntosh, the Indians put up significant resistance at Fort
Finney. The Miami outright refused to comply with the terms of
the treaty and many of the Shawnee were strongly opposed to it as
well. Apprehensive about making war with the Americans,
however, resentful Shawnee leaders finally agreed to sign the
treaty.
It was fortunate for the United States that all of the tribes
they treated with agreed to their terms, for the United States did
not have the military or monetary means necessary to go to war
with the Native Americans. In fact, Congress' lack of funds was
one of the major reasons that the United States vied for complete
control of the Northwest Territory in the first place. At the end of
the Revolutionary War the Continental Congress was about $40
million in debt. 244 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United
States' first constitutional document, the government did not have
the ability to impose taxes on the American people. As such, the
acquisition of funds was crucial for the federal government. By
obtaining the Northwest Territory, the federal government could
sell tracts of land to settlers and maintain profitable trade by
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having access to the Mississippi River. 245 Additionally, without the
money to fund an army to remove the Indians, the federal
government would not be able to make good on their threats to go
to war with the Indians, and needed to entice them to leave through
peaceful means. United States Native American policy was
entirely driven by the notion that securing peace with the Indians
would be the easiest and cheapest way of acquiring the Northwest
Territory. 246
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Hostilities on the Frontier and the Miami Confederacy
Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty of Fort Finney,
violence emerged on the frontier. It became clear just how
dissatisfied the Indians were with the treaty settlements. Henry
Knox, Secretary of War under the Continental Congress and during
Washington's presidency, was responsible for handling Indian
affairs. In 1786, Revolutionary War veteran General Josiah Harmar
wrote Knox to update him on the conditions in the Northwest
Territory. In his letter, Harmar explained to Knox that land
surveyors were eager to go out into the Northwest Territory and
were requesting escorts from Harmar. Because settlers were
already being attacked, Harmar feared that armed escorts would
bring out more hostilities from the angered Indians: "The murders
that have been committed lately upon the inhabitants passing up
and down the Ohio, indicate great dissatisfaction prevailing
amongst the Indians." 247
In the end months of 1786, various Indian tribes organized
a council in Sandusky, Ohio to discuss their dissatisfaction with
the treaties made with them and relations with the United States.
The Wyandot, Delaware, Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Miami,
Potawatomi, Cherokee, Six Nations, and members of the Wabash
247
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Confederacy were all present.

248

As each tribe had varying

experiences with the United States, there was some inconsistency
among their views. Some tribes, like the Delaware, Wyandot, and
the Seneca of the Six Nations were willing to promote amiable
relations with the United States. Joseph Brant, leader of the
Mohawk of the Six Nations, was not willing to settle for the
provisions made for his tribe in the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, but was
inclined to seek assistance in acquiring new land from the British
in Canada rather than engage in war with the Americans. On the
other hand, the Shawnee, Miami, and members of the Wabash
Confederacy were adamant about fighting to protect their lands
from the Americans. 249 These tribes, along with several Iroquois
tribes, the Ojibwa, the Ottawa, and the Potawatomi, formed the
Miami Confederacy, or the Northwest Confederacy. 250 The Miami
Confederacy, which was united loosely under the leadership of
Miami warrior chief Little Turtle, formed with the common
purpose of preventing the United States from taking any lands past
the Ohio River. 251
Amidst these growing tensions, the United States drafted
the Northwest Ordinance in 1787. The purpose of the Northwest
248
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Ordinance was to dictate how the Northwest Territory might be
organized and inducted into the United States. However, since the
federal government was aware of Indian grievances, the Northwest
Ordinance also affirmed that the United States would respect
Indian rights in regards to assuming Indian lands. The ordinance
dictated that the Northwest Territory be divided into no less than
three and no more than five states. Once a piece of territory
accumulated at least 60,000 free inhabitants the government would
admit it into the United States on equal status with all other
states. 252
The ordinance also specifically stated that the "utmost good
faith shall always be observed towards the Indians" and that "their
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their
consent." 253 While historians such as Reginald Horsman have
asserted that the language of the Northwest Ordinance indicated a
shift in Indian policy at this time, the federal government's
subsequent actions do not reflect the language of the Ordinance,
and it seems that there was little shift in Native American policy
during this period. The Ordinance indicated willingness to
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negotiate with the Indians. However, rather than negotiate with the
Indians, the federal government's simply tried to pay for the land
that they previously asserted was conquered territory. While this
change in technique certainly suggested a shift in attitude on the
United States' part, their end goal of acquiring those lands by any
means necessary remained the same.
Under the Northwest Ordinance, veteran of the American
Revolution Arthur St. Clair became the governor of the Northwest
Territory. Part of his initial instructions from Congress was to
make treaties with the Indians should the situation require it. As
hostilities had increased in recent months, it was clear that a treaty
was necessary. St. Clair was directed to alleviate "all causes of
controversy, so that peace and harmony may continue between the
United States and the Indian tribes, the regulating trade, and
settling boundaries." Congress authorized money specifically for
the purpose of renewing a treaty with the Indians, hoping that
compensation for the land would settle any animosity with the
Indians. In order to protect United States interest out west, St.
Clair's instructions further required him to maintain the statutes of
the current treaties, "unless a change of boundary beneficial to the
United States can be obtained." Such specifications indicated that
the United States was not actually willing to negotiate with the
Indians, but rather wanted to reaffirm their former treaties. 254 The
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United States' actions therefore did not necessarily match the
language of their policies, and their treatment of the Indians
remained essentially the same. Although members of the federal
government may have thought that they were being more
conciliatory in offering monetary compensation for the lands they
assumed, the issue for the Indians was not just in the lack of
compensation. Rather, the Indians were upset that the federal
government assumed it had any right to their lands at all. The
government's offer to pay for the lands actually did little to
alleviate any animosity.
St. Clair met with delegates from the Six Nations,
Delaware, Wyandot, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi in
December, 1788. Though invited, the aggravated Shawnee and
Miami tribes refused to negotiate land cession with the United
States and refused to participate in this treaty council. 255 What the
Indians desired out of this new treaty was a change in the land
boundary back to the Ohio River. 256 St. Clair refused, saying that
the British had ceded these lands to the United States and that the
boundaries had been fixed by the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort
McIntosh, and Fort Finney. St. Clair concluded deliberations with
the Indians by saying that the United States greatly desired peace
with the Indians, but would go to war with them if necessary. 257
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Although this treaty council offered the Indians another chance to
speak their piece, St. Clair still offered the same ultimatum.
Backed into a corner once more, these Indian tribes hesitantly
agreed. In January of 1789, St. Clair signed two treaties, together
known as the Treaty of Fort Harmar: one with the Six Nations, and
one with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwa, and
Potawatomi. Though this treaty was another attempt by the United
States to secure peace, it did nothing advantageous for either party.
Rather, it simply served to reaffirm previous United States treaties
and further anger the western Indian tribes.

Washington as President
As the Miami Confederacy become more organized and
aggravated by the new treaties, aggressions on the frontier
continued to escalate. When Washington entered the presidency in
1789, the hostilities seemed to be at their peak. Indian relations
were one of Washington's top priorities when he entered the
presidency. His aim was to find a way to make peace with the
Indians so that American citizens could begin to settle the
Northwest Territory without fear of conflict.
Washington's military career during the mid 1700s gave
him experience with Indians. As such, he was regarded as
somewhat of an Indian expert in the years leading up to his
presidency. Washington had always advocated that maintaining
peace with the Indians was crucial if the United States wanted to
152

settle the Northwest Territory. He believed that military action
should only be taken against the Indians as a last resort, as
purchasing Indian lands would be both cheaper and involve less
bloodshed. 258 Washington took this policy with him into his
presidency, and with violence at its peak, he developed several
initiatives to help secure peace with the Indians. Secretary of War
Knox was perhaps the most influential man in regards to Indian
policy during Washington's presidency. Washington and Knox
worked well together developing these policies, as they were
generally in agreement about how to handle Indian affairs. Both
Washington and Knox agreed that all measures should be taken to
promote peace and make treaties with the Indians rather than
engage in war. They believed it would be morally wrong to force
the Indians off their land without just cause. Knox had a
particularly sympathetic view towards the Indians. In a letter to
Washington, Knox expressed a desire protect Indian interests, as
the Indians were the "prior occupants" of the land, and as such
"possess[ed] the right of the Soil" in the Northwest Territory. He
was adamant that these lands "cannot be taken from them unless by
their free consent, or by the right of a just War…" To do otherwise
"would be a gross violation of the fundamental Laws of Nature and
of that destributive [sic] justice which is the glory of a nation." 259
Knox, like Washington, saw great potential for the nation
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in possession of the Northwest Territory. However, he believed
that there was little need to use force to acquire vast amounts of
land from the Indians: "As the settlements of the whites shall
approach near to the indian boundaries established by treaties, the
game will be diminished and the lands being valuable to the
indians only as hunting grounds, they will be willing to sell further
tracts for small considerations…" As their resources were
gradually depleted, Knox continued, the Indian populations would
decrease, "enabl[ing] the Union to operate against them [in battle]
with much greater prospect than at present." 260 Knox therefore
asserted that making peace with the Indians was in the best interest
of all, as going to war with them would hardly be worthwhile when
the United States would likely be able to acquire more lands from
them in the coming years.
In

general,

Washington's

Indian

policies

involved

strengthening the power of the federal government so that it could
better handle Indian relations. One of Washington's main goals
was to make sure that the federal government, not individual states,
was in charge of handling all Indian relations and treaties. In a
letter to Washington July, 1789, Knox confirmed his agreement
that the "general Sovereignty must possess the right of making all
treaties on the execution of violation of which depend peace or
war."
260
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Washington saw the demonstration of federal authority in Indian
affairs as crucial. In his mind, centralization of federal power
would enable the government to hold Indians and American
citizens accountable for any violence they caused, thereby
discouraging them from engaging in further hostilities.
There were, however, significant set-backs in Washington's
efforts to ensure peace by promoting Indian confidence in the
federal

government.

The

federal

government's

failure

to

immediately engage in military combat with the Indians caused the
citizens on the frontier to lose faith in the federal government's
ability to protect them. They therefore implemented their own kind
of punishment against the Indians, continuing more localized
aggressions towards Indians. This in turn made the Indians
question the federal government's sincerity and ability to uphold
their promises of holding the frontiersmen responsible for killing
Indians. Unfortunately, many of the victimized tribes were not
actively hostile towards the United States. The Miami and
Shawnee, two more western-based tribes, were particularly hostile
towards citizens on the frontier, but angry frontiersmen generally
attacked Indians indiscriminately. Governor St. Clair wrote
Washington in September, 1789 explaining the situation: "It is not
to be expected, sir, that the Kentucky people will or can submit
patiently to the cruelties and depredations of those savages; they
are in the habit of retaliation, perhaps, without attending precisely
155

to the nations from which the injuries are received…" 262 Thus, the
hostilities on the frontier not only aggravated already existing
animosity with the Indians, but also threatened the peaceful
relations that the United States had managed to secure with more
eastern-based tribes such as the Seneca.
While Washington and Knox both wanted to secure peace,
neither was willing to compromise the overall well-being of the
nation or the protection of its citizens. Washington had instructed
St. Clair to use military force on the frontier only as a last resort,
but by 1790, it was becoming increasingly clear that a last resort
might be necessary to subdue the Indians. 263 In a "Summary
Statement of the Situation of the Frontiers by the Secretary of
War" Knox explained that Josiah Harmar had given numerous
accounts of the "depredations of the Indians on the boats going
down the Ohio…" Knox noted the "bad effect [these hostilities
had] on the public mind…The result of this whole information
shows the inefficiency of defensive operations against the banditti
Shawnese and Cherokees, and some of the Wabash Indians on the
north-west of the Ohio." He therefore concluded that a military
expedition to punish the Indians and defend the frontier was the
right course of action. 264 It was no secret that Washington wanted
to build a stronger army when he entered the presidency. In his
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first address to Congress in January of 1790, he formally proposed
his goal of "of providing for the common defense." Washington
was a firm believer that being "prepared for war is one of the most
effectual means of preserving peace." 265 He hoped that by building
up the national army he could intimidate the Indians into agreeing
to peace with the United States. 266

Harmar's Defeat
Still hoping for a peaceful outcome, Congress nevertheless
agreed to Washington's plan of using the army to intimidate the
Indians. In 1790, Congress authorized an expansion of the army.
Led by Josiah Harmar, the new army would have one thousand
regulars and fifteen hundred militiamen from the states of
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

267

By late 1790, the

increasing conflict on the frontier made it clear that the Indians
were not going to be intimidated into making peace, and the United
States government would have to use force against them. Referring
back to the Northwest Ordinance, Washington and Congress
viewed this military expedition as a "just and lawful war," in which
they would swiftly punish the Indians for their destruction on the
frontier. In Knox's orders to Harmar on June 7, 1790, Knox stated
265
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that "No other remedy remains, but to extirpate, utterly, if possible,
the [Indian] banditti." 268 The plan was for Harmar to lead the main
body of troops west from Fort Washington to attack Miami
villages along the Maumee River, while Major John Hamtramck
came from Fort Knox in the west with three hundred regulars and
three hundred Kentucky militiamen. 269
As the United States prepared for their military expedition,
the federal government came to the agreement that the British
should be made aware of their plans. Since the British had not
actually left their western forts after the signing of the Treaty of
Paris, the United States did not want the British to think the
military expedition was aimed at pushing them out of the
Northwest Territory and risk renewing hostilities with them. As
such, Knox ordered St. Clair to contact the British commander at
Detroit and explain that the expedition was purely for the purpose
of punishing Indians who had been aggressive towards the United
States. 270
Although the British commander assured St. Clair that they
were not concerned about this, they immediately notified British
traders in Miami villages, who assisted the Indians by giving them
supplies to prepare for an attack from the United States. When
Harmar and his men reached the Miami villages in the middle of
268
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October, they found them abandoned, as the Indians had been
warned ahead of time. The army burned the villages regardless,
thinking that if they could not punish the Indians directly, they
could at least destroy their homes and supplies. Meanwhile,
Harmar sent Colonel John Hardin and approximately three hundred
men to pursue the fleeing Indians. Instead of a swift subjugation of
the Indians, Hardin found an ambush waiting for him and his men.
Taken by surprise, the men lost all organization and dispersed. The
militiamen fled the scene completely, leaving the regulars to fend
for themselves. After a brutal attack that left almost two hundred
dead and several dozen wounded, the regulars retreated back to the
rest of the army. 271
Washington was extremely angered by this loss and blamed
the defeat on Harmar's perceived deficiencies. In a letter to Knox,
Washington accused Harmar of being both a drunkard and an
ineffective leader: "I expected little from the moment I heard he
was a drunkard. I expected less as soon as I heard that on this
account no confidence was reposed to him by the people of the
Western Country—And I gave up all hope of Success, as soon as I
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Figure 3

Federal Campaigns, Sept.-Oct., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1985), 90.

heard that there were disputes with him about command." 272
Despite Washington's fervor in his criticisms of Harmar, the
responsibility of the defeat did not rest solely on Harmar's
shoulders. In fact, most of Washington's assertions about Harmar's
conduct were false. According to Washington biographer John
Ferling, Washington was inclined to find scapegoats to blame
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when situations under his command deteriorated. 273 Harmar was
certainly the easiest man to blame in this instance, and his
reputation never fully recovered.
In truth, the failure of the expedition should be attributed to
a myriad of factors, the most significant being the poor quality of
the militia. The militia, comprised of ill-trained men not entirely fit
for military work, made up the majority of the military force of this
expedition. Their haste to abandon the battle as soon as they were
under attack left the regulars severely outnumbered, which
essentially forced them to retreat. 274 Moreover, the entire force was
significantly weakened when Harmar authorized his troops to
separate into different groups. Only a small portion of the available
men were actually present during the Indian attack, as the rest had
remained to burn the villages. 275 In the planning of this expedition,
Congress specifically authorized the recruitment of more men so
that Harmar would be prepared should the Indians have managed
to accrue a strong force of warriors against them. Regardless of the
reasoning behind Harmar's failure, hostilities on the frontier
increased as a result of this direct attack on the Indians. Fear
among frontier settlers was rising, and they demanded that the
federal government act to protect them. The federal government
hastily began plans for a new military expedition.
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St. Clair's Defeat
Washington and Congress knew that they had to deal with
the Indian problem immediately. Many Americans had not
believed the Indians capable of raising a force able to defeat an
organized American army. The results of the expedition proved
otherwise and frontier settlers began to panic that they would be
the victims of a mass Indian attack. Knox and Washington quickly
set about planning for a second expedition. They appealed to
Congress for an expansion of the army to three thousand men. This
time they called for twelve hundred regulars, thirteen hundred
volunteer levies, and five hundred rangers. 276 It was not too
difficult for Washington and Knox to convince Congress that such
an expansion was necessary, as both Harmar and Washington's
administration had blamed the failure of the expedition at least
partly on the inadequacy of the militia.
Harmar's failed expedition had threatened the federal
government's reputation—it was now in jeopardy of being seen as
incapable of protecting its citizens and ineffective in handling
disputes. Yet, in some sense Harmar's defeat was advantageous to
276
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Washington, as it enabled him to set the foundation for a
reformation of the militia system. Washington's contemporaries
had known his distaste for the militia since the Revolutionary War,
and many had expected him to appeal for the creation of a large
national army when he came into office. Although Washington
avoided aligning with any particular political faction, like many of
his Federalist contemporaries he desired a strong standing army to
protect the nation and demonstrate the power of the federal
government. However, Washington was aware of political tensions
between the emerging Federalist and Democratic-Republican
political parties. He did not want party alliances to divide the
nation, and he avoided aligning with either party, despite his
agreement with certain Federalist views. He knew that pushing for
a standing army upon his entrance into the presidency would be
viewed unfavorably by many citizens. Many Americans associated
standing armies with martial law from their experiences with the
presence of the British army during the Revolution. 277
Washington hoped that by using more regulars and
volunteers the army would be an adequately trained force to
accomplish the goal of subduing the Indians. Unlike militiamen,
regulars and volunteers were required to submit to traditional
military discipline. These men would not only be better trained, but
also act more professionally in the face of battle. 278 Washington
277
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appointed St. Clair as major general of this new army, hoping that
he would prove a better leader than Harmar.
St. Claire's plan was to leave Philadelphia in March, 1791,
lead his army to Fort Washington in order to meet Kentucky
militiamen, and then proceed with the attack in the Wabash Valley.
However, St. Clair left Philadelphia later than planned and faced
additional unforeseen delays, as he had difficulty acquiring
sufficient numbers of men and adequate supplies. St. Clair did not
reach Fort Washington until the middle of May, and even then not
all the militia had arrived from other states. The troops were not
fully convened until September, at which point it was late in the
season to be embarking on a military expedition as they risked
suffering through the winter months. 279 St. Clair, however, assured
Knox in a letter on September 18, 1791 "that every possible
exertion shall be made to bring the campaign to a speedy and
happy issue." 280 Despite the delays St. Clair felt secure his ability
to lead a successful expedition. He was certain of the superior
military ability of the United States army. He felt, as did Knox and
many of his other contemporaries, sure that the disjointed war
tactics of the Indians would be no match for his disciplined army,
even if the Indians managed to outnumber them. 281
St. Clair should have not have so greatly underestimated his
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opponents; he and his men expected the Indians to be severely
disorganized. But what they did not know was that the Indians, led
by the Miami and Shawnee tribes, had gone to Detroit after the
incident with Harmar to request assistance from the British. Blue
Jacket, one of the Shawnee leaders, appealed to the British saying
the United States had plans to take all their lands: "as a People we
are determined to meet the approaches of an Enemy, who came not
to check the Insolence of individuals, but with a premeditated
design to root us out of our Land, which we and our forefathers
and children were and are bound to defend, and which we are
determined to do." 282 The commanding officers in Detroit told the
Indians that they could offer no troops to support them, as they
would risk getting into conflict with the United States. They did,
however, offer the Indians supplies they needed to take on the
American troops.
Not only were the Indians able to obtain British support,
but they also managed to become much more organized than St.
Clair, Knox, or Washington could have anticipated. Harmar's
expedition had confirmed the fears of Indian tribes in the Wabash
that the United States had the intention of usurping all western
Indian lands. Other tribes, such as the Kickapoo, Wea, and
Piankeshaw, who had been on the fence about combating the
Americans were now convinced of American intentions and came
282
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to the aid of the Miami and the Shawnee. 283 The desperate fear of
losing their lands banned these tribes together. Having caught wind
of the American army's plans, they made their way to the Miami
villages to prepare to ambush the American army.
On November 4, 1791 as St. Clair and his men finally made
their way to the Miami villages, they were met with a full-blown
Indian attack. 284 The Indians completely surrounded the American
army with organization that blindsided St. Clair and overwhelmed
his men. The Indians used their traditional style of warfare and
their knowledge of European war tactics to their advantage. The
Indians were used to fighting as individuals, and they swiftly
overtook American soldiers. They specifically targeted military
officers, as they knew that without leadership the American
soldiers would be completely disoriented and unable to fight as a
unit. 285 Those who survived the attack retreated to Fort Jefferson
on St. Clair's orders. The losses were devastating. Thirty-seven
officers and nearly six hundred enlisted men were killed, while
thirty-two officers and approximately two-hundred and fifty men
were wounded. 286
On November 9, after St. Clair and his men had made it
back to Fort Washington, St. Clair wrote Knox to tell him of the
terrible loss. Washington was furious about the results of this
283
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second campaign. He was now in a difficult position and faced a
great deal of criticism. How could he explain how the military
expedition had failed a second time? While he was able to blame
the incompetency of Harmar for the failure of the first expedition,
he knew he could not blame St. Clair this time, as it would only
show that he was unable to provide a capable general for this
task. 287 Similarly, the militia could not be solely to blame, as much
of the militia of the last expedition had been replaced by regulars
for St. Clair's expedition. 288 Washington had to report to Congress
news of the defeat, and a special committee was developed to
investigate what led to the loss of the expedition.
As the committee sought to get to the bottom of the matter,
newspapers such as the New York Journal & Patriotic Register,
Columbian Centinel, Connecticut Courant, and Maryland Gazette
all published accounts of St. Clair's Defeat, which stirred up a
variety of public opinions. 289 A typical reaction to St. Clair's
Defeat was a desire for revenge on the murderous Indians. A
Kentucky resident wrote to a friend in Philadelphia, “The news of
the defeat of the troops under Gov. St. Clair by the Indians, so far
from disheartening has filled every man in Kentucky with a thirst
for revenge.” 290
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Some members of the public were angered that the United
States had attempted such an incursion in the first place, and felt
that the United States was causing unnecessary problems with the
Indians: "Are we not already in possession of more lands than can
be settled for a century at least? … What better right have we to
march through the centre of their country, than Great-Britain
would have to march a body of troops through the centre of the
United States?" 291 In speaking so vehemently against the Indian
expeditions, this writer, under the pseudonym "Anti-Pizaro,"
accused the federal government of impeding on the rights of the
Indians to acquire more lands. He also raised questions about the
real motivations for such an excursion: "Is it to conquer more
lands, or to serve as a pretence for augmenting the standing
army?" 292 The public was clearly questioning the government's
Indian policies and motivations in the Indian war. Many worried
that it was part of a Federalist ploy to give the government more
power.
Another segment, this time appearing in the National
Gazette, seconded that sentiment:
The principles of the war it is hoped,
will be thoroughly investigated, that
the revenues of the States should not
be wantonly expended in disgraceful
campaigns. Americans having just
291
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freed themselves from an expensive
war, it is our interest to promote
friendship and harmony with all the
world, and not to sacrifice our young
men and our money, to acquire
territory by war, while so much land
remains unsettled, and which courts
our cultivation under the auspices of
peace. 293
This author stated that the federal government's reckless ambitions
to secure the Northwest Territory were a waste of both men and
money. Moreover, he implied that engaging in an unnecessary war
to acquire lands painted the United States in a negative light to
other nations, making the United States seem greedy and
uncompromising.
Yet, there was also a portion of the public who supported
Washington and his Native American policies. Rather than
asserting that the United States had selfish and unjust motives in
sending soldiers into the Northwest Territory, these citizens
defended Washington and the federal government, assuring readers
that Washington had been forced into taking military action in
order to protect the nation. In one article posted in the Connecticut
Gazette gave an explanation of how treaties were attempted with
the hostile Wabash Indians, but they declined the offer and
continued their hostilities: "The campaign, therefore, of the last
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Figure 4

St. Clair's Defeat Battle Map in Colin G. Calloway, The
Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of
the First American Army (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 118.
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and this year, were measures of necessity—The Indians had been
invading our frontiers, and had killed many hundred innocent men,
women and children..." 294 Citizens of this opinion were grateful
that the government had taken action to protect them.
These inconsistent views about the Northwest Indian War
are representative of the larger national debate at this time. Party
alliances were becoming increasingly distinct, which resulted in
starkly contrasting views about what the roles and responsibilities
of the federal government should be. The special committee
focused on many of these issues in their investigation of St. Clair's
Defeat, questioning the amount of authority the federal
government should have and what the responsibilities of elected
officials were. Ultimately St. Clair was pardoned from any
responsibility for the defeat. Congress and other elected officials
were blamed for the delay in securing adequate funds for the
expedition. Although it was not overtly stated, Washington and
Knox also received a great deal of blame, as they had given the
orders for St. Clair's campaign. 295 St. Clair's Defeat had brought on
a great deal of criticism of the federal government.

Assertion of Federal Power and Wayne's Campaign
It was clear at this point that there was a divide within the
United States about whether this Indian war should have taken
294
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place at all. Many people were questioning the moral validity of
the war as well as the creation of an army to deal with the issue.
The political divide between

Democratic-Republicans and

Federalists became much more distinct as Congress and
Washington's administration debated what course of action to
take.

296

The Democratic-Republicans thought that the federal

government was out of its depth and abusing its power to take over
the Northwest Territory, while the Federalists tended to support the
power of the federal government. Throughout the debate
Washington maintained that the federal government needed to be
consistent and continue its aims to take control of the Northwest
Territory. 297 Now more than ever he felt it was essential to the
federal government's reputation that they succeed.
Congress tended to agree with Washington. After two
failed expeditions, it would make the United States appear weak to
simply give up. The federal government sincerely needed to prove
its capability to its citizens. However, America's armed forces
desperately needed to be salvaged after St. Clair's defeat and
Congress feared that the frontier would experience the full extent
of Indian wrath while they were trying to rebuild the army. 298
Therefore, while Washington and Knox worked on a plan for the
new army, Congress authorized peace commissioners to meet with
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the Indians early in 1792. The Shawnee and Miami attended the
meeting, along with several of the tribes that allied with them. The
Shawnee and Miami also managed to convince the Six Nations to
negotiate as well, although they had minimal involvement with the
Northwest Indian War.
It is unlikely that the federal government actually expected
peace to come out of this meeting. Although it certainly would
have been optimal for the United States for the Indians to concede
to give up their lands peacefully, no one believed that to be a
realistic outcome. British lieutenant governor of Upper Canada
John Graves Simcoe indicated that he believed that the Indians and
Americans commissioners had met for the same reason: not
actually to secure peace, but to procrastinate. In fact, he believed
that the meeting was only a way for both sides to be assured in
their missions: for the Americans, that the Indians needed to be
destroyed; for the Indians, that the United States must be stopped
in their efforts to take Indians lands. 299
The peace talk went exactly as expected: neither side was
willing to compromise. The American commissioners attempted to
assure the Indians that they wanted to make peace with them, while
the Indians declared to the commissioners that if the United States
did not abide by the Ohio River boundary line, there could be no
peace. The commissioners held firm, saying that as the Indians'
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land had been ceded in the Treaty of Paris. The Indians responded
that they had never agreed to give possession of their lands to the
king of England, so it was not his land to cede to the United
States. 300 The Indians then declared that they would not leave the
lands that were rightfully theirs. The American commissioners
then resolved to return home, unable to make peace once more.
Meanwhile, Washington and Knox had been hard at work
reforming the United States army. Now that circumstances
demanded an army for the protection of the nation, Washington
was able to develop a large standing army and reform the militia
system, as he and his Federalist contemporaries had always wanted
to do. 301 Knox developed a proposal for a new army of five
thousand men to be enlisted for three years. In his proposal, Knox
asserted that use of the militia for situations such as this would not
be sufficient: "while it is acknowledged that mounted militia may
be very proper for sudden enterprises, of short duration, it is
conceived that militia are utterly unsuitable to carry on and
terminate the war in which we are engaged, with honor and
success." 302 Knox and Washington also reorganized the army from
an infantry, cavalry, and artillery into four sublegions, each
commanded by a brigadier general. Washington appointed General
Anthony Wayne, another veteran of the Revolution, to command
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this army.
As for reforming the militia, Congress passed two acts that
changed militia regulations. The first gave the president the ability
to call upon the state militias when the nation was in jeopardy. The
second act required all capable free white men between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia. Overall, these
military reforms strengthened the power of the federal government,
as they gave the government much more military authority.
With this new force under his command, General Wayne
arrived at Fort Washington in May, 1793 and began to prepare for
the expedition. From the beginning this campaign went much more
smoothly than the others. By the end of December Wayne and his
men had made their way to the site of St. Clair's Defeat,
established Fort Greenville, and set themselves up to remain there
for the winter. 303 In June, the Indians attempted an attack on the
fort, but were fought off by the American army. The Potawatomi,
Ojibwa, and Ottawa tribes were discouraged by this unsuccessful
attack and abandoned the rest of the Miami Confederacy, greatly
reducing the military power of their union. The army under
Wayne's command was far more prepared for frontier fighting than
that of either St. Clair or Harmar. To further weaken the Indian
forces, Wayne's plan was to target the Indian villages' food and
supplies as he and his army made their way along the Auglaize
303
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River. By August, Wayne and his men held the center of the
Miami Confederacy at the intersection of the Maumee and
Auglaize Rivers.
On August 19, the Indians prepared to meet the American
army. The battle that came to be known as the Battle of Fallen
Timbers took place the following morning. When the battle
occurred, it was clear the Indians were severely outnumbered. This
time the American army's organization and discipline were more
than adequate to take on the Indians. The Americans quickly
overtook the Indians, who retreated and sought assistance from the
British at Fort Miami. The British, despite their previous
assistance, were now engaged in the French Revolution in Europe
and unwilling to risk conflict with the Americans. They refused to
help the Indians, leaving them to fend for themselves. 304 Thus,
Wayne's army was easily able to overtake the retreating Indians.
The Battle of Fallen Timbers was, finally, an American victory.
In December of 1794, Wayne met with the Indian tribes to
discuss peace. They agreed to meet in June of 1795 at Greenville
to set a formal treaty. 305 That summer, the Indians officially signed
the Treaty of Greenville that waived their rights to two-thirds of
Ohio and some smaller pieces of land in Indiana. Leaders of the
Shawnee, Wyandot, Ottawa, and Delaware all signed the
document. The Northwest Indian War was finally over and the
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Figure 5

Wayne's Campaign, July-Aug., 1790 in Wiley Sword, President
Washington's Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest,
1790-1795 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1985), 274.
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federal government had demonstrated its authority. To uphold
authority in the Northwest Territory, the federal government
maintained a military presence on the frontier to supply forts that
protected western trade. 306 Around the same time, in November,
1794, United States delegate John Jay successfully negotiated a
treaty with Britain. Jay's Treaty, as it was known, required Britain
to finally relinquish its posts on the frontiers. With both treaties
secured, the Americans finally had complete access to the
Northwest Territory.

Conclusion
What

Washington

and

the

United

States

federal

government failed to realize was that from the moment the Treaty
of Paris was signed, conflict with the Indians was inevitable. So
long as Indian policy operated under the assumption that the
United States was the sovereign power in the Northwest Territory,
Indian tribes were going to resist. The Indians had never
recognized Great Britain as the previous sovereign power in the
Northwest Territory, and thus felt the United States had no valid
claim to the lands, especially since the Indians had no desire to
give up those lands. The federal government wanted the
impossible: they wanted the lands in the Northwest Territory and
they wanted them peacefully. Their unwillingness to compromise
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any of the lands in the Northwest Territory combined with their
lack of respect for Indian rights to those lands set up explosive
tensions that no amount of peace treaties could alleviate.
When Washington entered the presidency, his plan to
secure peace with the Indians revolved around the strengthening of
the federal government. Mainly, he wanted both the Indians and
the individual states to recognize the federal government as the
authority on Indian affairs, and to strengthen the United States'
military force in order to enforce the federal government's power.
As violence escalated on the frontier, the demands of citizens for
protection from the federal government erupted. However, the new
nation’s fragile state meant the federal government had little
military power or funds to accomplish this. Two failed military
expeditions against the Indians resulted in a federal reform of the
army and militia system, significantly strengthening the power of
the federal government. Without the violence of the Northwest
Indian War, the demands for protection from United States citizens
would not have driven Congress to make such federal reforms.
In this way, the events of the Northwest Indian War
ultimately contributed to determining the role of the federal
government in the early republic. With their demands for
protection, American citizens on the frontier inadvertently
conceded to a more centralized, more powerful government. Much
to the chagrin of many of these citizens, the desire for a
government that had the strength to protect them also created a
179

government with a capable force to use against them. When the
Whiskey Rebellion erupted in Western Pennsylvania, Washington
was able to quell the violent insurrection by calling upon the state
militias in July, 1794. Such a use of force served to illustrate the
newfound capabilities of the federal government to enforce their
laws and policies throughout the nation.
Congress was right in asserting that the fate of the nation
was tied to the acquisition of the Northwest Territory; yet, it was
tied in unforeseeable ways. Beyond economic security, the events
of the Northwest Indian War enabled Washington to achieve some
of

his goals for the nation. Washington secured a stronger,

more centralized government by calling for consolation of Indian
affairs under the federal government and the creation of a federal
army to protect the nation. Doing so ultimately allowed the United
State to finally achieve victory in the Northwest Indian War. These
policies certainly sparked contention among both citizens and
Indians, raising questions as to the validity and justification of the
United States' actions during the Northwest Indian War, the
morality of which continues to be debated. Nevertheless, such a
victory proved to American citizens, Indians, and European powers
looking on that the United States was not only a force to be
reckoned with, but worthy of "the respect of the world."
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